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Economic convergence and exchange rate misalignments 
in the European Union 
 
Judit Kreko – Gábor Oblath 
Abstract  
We investigate (i) the characteristics of real economic and price convergence, (ii) the 
relationship between economic growth (convergence) and real exchange rate (RER) 
misalignments within the European Union (EU) during the period 1995–2016. In addition to 
the relative external price level of GDP, we quantified an alternative indicator for the RER: 
the internal relative price of services to goods, as measured from the expenditure side of 
GDP. We interpreted RER-misalignments as deviations from levels consistent with levels of 
economic development among EU countries. Regarding real convergence, the “catching up” 
of the less developed member states to the more affluent ones within the EU was expressly 
rapid in terms of relative per capita growth measured at current PPPs; it was less impressive 
if measured at constant PPPs, and rather modest in terms of relative real GDP-growth. As for 
price levels and the relative price of services to goods, a rapid convergence could be observed 
until the international financial crisis, but this process halted in 2008.  
Using pooled OLS and dynamic panel techniques, we found that within the EU there is a 
negative relationship between the contemporaneous sign of RER-misalignment (based on 
both the external price level and internal relative prices) and economic growth: over-  
(under-) valuations are associated with lower (higher) growth. This is mainly due to 
developments in countries operating under fixed exchange rate regimes. Our results indicate 
that the level of development does not influence the strength of the growth-misalignment 
relationship within the EU. These results are robust to the applied panel estimation method. 
Regarding the external price level, we find that the positive relationship between 
undervaluation and growth diminishes with increasing size of undervaluation. The aggregate 
effect of misalignments is significantly negative on both export market shares and the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to GDP: both the competitiveness and the investment channel 
play an important role in the relationship between growth and RER misalignments. As an 
extension, we analyse the relationship between growth and the misalignment of wages from 
productivity levels; “wage-misalignments” are also negatively associated with economic 
growth.  
Although our study carries policy messages – in particular, mild real exchange rate 
undervaluations are positively, while overvaluations are negatively associated with growth 
and real economic convergence – the RER is an endogenous variable, which is not under 
direct policy control. Our results point to the importance of a growth strategy avoiding 
overvaluation on the one hand, and to the futility of aiming at excessive undervaluation, on 
the other.  
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Gazdasági felzárkózás és valuta-félreértékeltség  
az Európai Unióban 
 
Kreko Judit – Oblath Gábor 
Összefoglaló 
Tanulmányunk a reálgazdasági és az árszintfelzárkózás jellegzetességeit, valamint a gazdasági 
növekedés (felzárkózás) és a reálárfolyam félreértékeltsége közötti összefüggéseket vizsgálja 
az Európai Unió (EU) tagországaiban az 1995 és 2016 közötti időszakban. A fejletlenebb 
tagországoknak a fejlettebbekhez történt felzárkózása a GDP/fő alapján folyó vásárlóerő-
paritáson mérve kifejezetten gyors volt, mérsékeltebb konstans vásárlóerő-paritáson, és 
kifejezetten szerénynek bizonyult a GDP reálnövekedése alapján. Az általános árszintek és a 
belső relatív árak felzárkózását tekintve a 2008. évi nemzetközi gazdasági válságig gyors 
közeledés mutatkozott, azt követően azonban a folyamat elakadt. 
A GDP külső relatív árszintje mellett egy alternatív reálárfolyam-szint mutatót, a 
szolgáltatásoknak az árukhoz viszonyított belső relatív árát is számszerűsítettük, és a 
félreértékeltséget a gazdasági fejlettséggel konzisztens szinttől való eltérésként értelmeztük. 
OLS, valamint dinamikus panelmódszerekre épülő eredményeink szerint negatív kapcsolat 
van mind a külső, mind a belső relatív ár alapján értelmezett egyidejű félreértékeltség előjele 
és a növekedés között: az alulértékeltség gyorsabb, a túlértékeltség lassúbb növekedéssel jár. 
Ez az eredmény elsősorban a rögzített árfolyamrendszereket fenntartó országokhoz köthető. 
Eltérően a kapcsolódó irodalomban közölt eredményektől azt találtuk, hogy az EU-
tagországok esetében a gazdasági fejlettség szintje nem befolyásolja a félreértékeltség és a 
növekedés közötti kapcsolat szorosságát. A külső relatív árszintre vonatkozó számításaink 
szerint az alulértékeltség és a növekedés közötti pozitív kapcsolat erőssége az alulértékeltség 
mértékének emelkedésével gyengül; ez azonban nem mutatható ki a belső relatív ár alapján 
értelmezett félreértékeltség esetében. Fordított kapcsolatot mutattunk ki egyfelől a 
félreértékeltség mindkét mutatója, másfelől a piaci részesedés, illetve a beruházási ráta 
alakulása között, ami azt jelzi, hogy mind a versenyképességi, mind pedig a beruházási 
csatorna fontos közvetítő lehet a félreértékeltség és a növekedés között. Elemzésünk 
kiegészítéseként a bér- és termelékenységi szintek közötti összhanghiányként értelmezett 
félreértékeltség és a gazdasági növekedés összefüggését is megvizsgáltuk; eredményeink 
szerint a béralapú félreértékeltség is fordított kapcsolatban van a növekedéssel.  
Tanulmányuk gazdaságpolitikai üzenete kettős: miközben a túlértékeltséget mindenképpen 
célszerű megelőzni, az alulértékeltség fokozására irányuló igyekezet sem használ a gazdaság 
növekedésének.  
 
Tárgyszavak: reálgazdasági és árszintfelzárkózás, reálárfolyam, külső és belső relatív árszint, 
valuta-félreértékeltség. 
 
JEL-kód: E01, F45, O40; O47; O52; P22; P27 
 
Köszönetnyilvánítás: A tanulmány alapjául szolgáló kutatást az NKFI K-124808 számú 
projektje támogatta. A szerzők köszönetet mondanak Halpern Lászlónak, Kónya Istvánnak és 
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“This will in some measure account for the different value of money in different 
countries; it will explain to us why the prices of home commodities, and those of great 
bulk, though of comparatively small value, are, independently of other causes, higher 
in those countries where manufactures flourish.” (David Ricardo)1  
1. Introduction 
Our study departs from some general observations on economic convergence and developments 
related to convergence within the European Union (EU), the group of countries in the focus of the 
present study.  
First, and most importantly, while economic convergence – the catching up of less developed 
countries to the more affluent ones – is not a universal phenomenon, it did characterise the present 
member-states of the EU over the years 1995 – 2016, the period covered by our work. 
The second observation relates to the fact that economic convergence is a complex process, 
involving a number of interrelated developments. Catching up in terms of per capita real income 
(measured by per capita real GDP) tends to be accompanied by convergence in productivity (GDP per 
employed persons or hours worked), price levels, relative prices, nominal and real wages, as well as 
sectoral shares. The relationships in the focus of the present study are those between real incomes 
(levels of productivity)2, price levels and internal price structures of countries. 
This leads to the third observation: there is a close spatial (cross-county) association between 
relative real incomes, price levels and price structures within the EU. Higher (lower) levels of real 
incomes tend to be accompanied by higher (lower) general price levels, as well as higher (lower) 
relative prices of services to goods. As attested by subsequent rounds of the Penn World Tables 
(PWT), the positive correlation between real incomes and price levels is a worldwide phenomenon; 
this relationship, however, as shown in section 4, holds much more closely within the EU.3  
The fourth observation, directly relevant for our study, is that neither the cross-section, nor the 
longer-term dynamic relationships linking these aspects of economic convergence necessarily hold at 
a point in time, or in the short-to-medium run for individual countries. This implies that in the case of 
some countries (or a group of countries) convergence in terms of external/internal relative prices can 
“precede” convergence measured by relative real incomes, while other countries (a group therein) 
may experience the opposite, i.e., that price convergence “lags behind” real economic convergence.  
Our study aims to investigate the implications of such “disconnects” between levels (structures) of 
relative prices and relative real incomes in the process of economic convergence. We shall refer to 
these disconnects as misalignments of relative external and/or internal relative prices from relative 
real incomes. Our major interest lies in the relationship between misalignments and economic 
growth. 
The concept of misalignment, naturally, begs the question: what is the point of reference for its 
empirical interpretation? In other words: what (where) is the “non-misaligned” (or “neutral”) 
                                                          
1
 Ricardo (1951), p. 142. 
2
 Int this section we use the term „real income” as a shorthand for expressing both GDP per capita and GDP per 
labour input (productivity) measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). Later on we will make a distincion 
between the two.  
3
 We compare some global trends revealed by the PWT (2017) with the ones characterising the EU in section 4.  
7 
 
level/structure of prices corresponding to the actual state of real economic convergence of a 
particular country?  
The basic notion underlying our study is that within a group of countries consisting of members at 
considerably different levels of economic development, but closely integrated by trade, capital and 
labour flows – such is the EU – the overall pattern reflecting the relationship between relative prices 
and incomes for the group as a whole offers guidance for judging misalignments in individual 
members of the group. This practically means that in this study the regression line (more precisely: 
regressions based on alternative specifications) expressing the relationship between prices and 
incomes for the EU as a whole is (are) considered to be the benchmark(s) for the empirical 
interpretation of misalignments in member-states. Positive/negative deviations from the benchmark 
(residuals of the regressions, alternatively specified) are interpreted as indications of 
over/undervaluation with respect to the specified benchmark. As discussed and explained later, we 
rely both on the pooled cross-section data for EU-countries over the period 1995-2016 and on the 
analysis of five year-periods in our quantitative estimates of misalignments.  
However, our actual interest is not simply in quantifying misalignments, but also in investigating the 
relationship between misalignments and economic growth (real economic convergence). In order to 
clarify these relationships, we shall apply alternative indicators of both misalignment and real 
convergence. To check the effect/significance of misalignments within the EU, we complement 
standard growth equations with indicators of misalignment, similarly to other works on real 
exchange rates and economic growth. (In section 2.2 and 5.1 we present a selective review of the 
related literature.)  
Our approach is expressly pragmatic with respect to the quantification of misalignment, since we do 
not have strong prior views regarding the preferred indicator and/or specification (whether the one 
based on external or internal relative prices is more suitable, or whether indicators with or without 
controls are superior etc.). Similarly, instead of applying a single indicator for measuring real 
economic growth/convergence (as usually done in the respective literature), we use several 
indicators. Beside the change in relative per capita GDP measured at current purchasing power parity 
(PPP), we shall apply other indicators as well (relative GDP per employed, per capita GDP a constant 
PPPs, GDP-growth). We expect that this pragmatic approach helps both in identifying the relevant 
relationships and in demonstrating the complexity of the relationships involved. 
The use of alternative indicators for measuring real economic convergence is supported by the 
observation that the “catching up” of the less developed member states to the more affluent ones 
within the EU was rather rapid in terms of relative per capita growth measured at current PPPs; it 
was less impressive if measured at constant PPPs, and rather modest in terms of relative real GDP-
growth (i.e., disregarding relative changes in population). Moreover, while the first two indicators 
point only to a deceleration in real economic convergence, the third suggests an effective halt in 
convergence after the global economic and financial crisis of 2009. The fact that a significant decline 
in the absolute size of population in the less developed (Central and East-European) EU member-
states has significantly contributed – at least in a technical sense – to convergence in terms of per 
capita GDP within the EU has not received sufficient attention in the literature. As to be 
demonstrated in section 4, the overall trend in the world economy has been exactly the opposite, 
i.e., convergence measured by GDP-growth has been more rapid than if measured by growth in per 
capita GDP. However, we will also show that, irrespective of the indicator chosen, the speed of real 
convergence within the EU has been much higher than in the global economy during the period 
covered by our analysis. 
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Our approach to the issues addressed in this study is similar to Balassa’s (1965) interpretation of 
“revealed” comparative advantage. Balassa, skipping the questions concerning the sources of 
comparative advantage, focused on their effects revealed by countries’ actual specialisation in 
foreign trade. In a similar vein, we do not dwell on the reasons why less developed countries’ relative 
prices are lower than those of more affluent ones; we estimate relationships revealed by the 
statistical data. We continue by applying the indicators of misalignment having turned out to be 
statistically significant for estimating growth equations in order to clarify: which of the estimated 
measures of misalignment are relevant with respect to alternative indicators of economic 
convergence. 
Having referred to Balassa, we need to stress that that the term “Balassa-Samuelson- (BS-) effect”, a 
basic reference in the literature on our subject, has intentionally been avoided in the foregoing. 
Though the BS-“effect” is often referred to as a description of the phenomena addressed in our study 
(i.e., higher levels/growth rates in real incomes are accompanied by higher levels/growth rates in 
external and internal relative prices), the BS-model is not a description, but one of the possible – 
often challenged – explanations of the phenomena observed. As to be discussed in section 2, 
alternative models can also explain the same phenomena from either the supply or the demand side 
of the economy. Though we touch upon alternative explanations of the observed empirical 
regularity, our analyses and findings do not depend on the validity of particular models providing 
explanations. Therefore, throughout our study we apply the terminology suggested by Samuelson 
(1994): we address the phenomenon as the “Penn effect”, which refers to the statistical source (the 
PWT) having revealed the empirical regularity, and does not allude to any of its challengeable 
explications.  
Another concept evaded in the foregoing, but to be treated briefly in section 5, is the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (ERER). The reason for avoiding this notion is that we do not wish to confuse the 
concept of misalignment of relative prices, as applied in our study, with deviations from alternatively 
interpreted and measured ERERs. Our interpretation of misalignments is related, but does not 
necessarily correspond, to concepts involving external and internal macroeconomic balance implied 
by notions of ERERs.  
While avoiding the notion of the ERER, we do rely on the concept of the real exchange rate (RER), 
and use it for expressing two distinct price-ratios: the external relative price level of GDP and the 
internal relative price of services to goods; both compared to the average of the EU15. It should be 
noted that a RER-index is generally interpreted as a nominal exchange rate index divided by a relative 
price index, while the indicators in our focus are relative price indices divided by exchange rates (the 
inverse of commonly interpreted RERs). By an “upward” misalignment we mean overvaluation, while 
a “downward” misalignment means the opposite, i.e., undervaluation throughout our study. Keeping 
this in mind, we use the terms “relative prices” and RERs in the same sense. 
Our study intends to contribute to the literature on the relationship between relative prices (real 
exchange rates, RER) and economic growth in several respects. 
First, and most importantly, the literature on this topic has mainly addressed the experiences of 
developing countries or a very broad set of countries; just a few studies dealt specifically with the EU, 
which consists of countries at both high and medium level of income. Our work, in turn, focuses on 
the experiences of member-states of the EU, a group having been characterised by rapid real 
economic convergence. However, we shall make comparisons between the EU and a much broader 
sample, based on the PWT, regarding the relationship between price and income levels, as well as 
real economic convergence. Our analyses are expected to contribute the clarification of the 
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relationship between real and relative price convergence, as well as the effects of misalignments on 
real economic convergence.  
Second, studies related to our topic generally rely on the external relative price of GDP to express the 
real exchange rate (RER) and to quantify misalignments. Our work draws on two interrelated, but 
distinct measures: the external relative price of GDP and the internal relative price of services to 
goods. In addition, besides drawing on the relationship between relative prices and real income for 
quantifying misalignments, we also investigate the relationship between relative prices and 
productivity, measured by GDP per persons employed.  
Third, our analyses primarily draw on the Eurostat PPP-database, providing data measured at current 
PPPs. Most of the related studies, covering large groups of countries, rely on the PWT-database, built 
on price comparisons at constant PPPs. We believe that for the purposes of our analyses 
comparisons of price levels at current PPPs is the appropriate approach, since price comparions at 
constant PPPs are affected by the chioice of the base year.  
Fourth, rather than relying on a single indicator for expressing comparative growth performance (i.e., 
relative per capita GDP at PPP), we consider two additional measures to capture the notion of real 
economic growth/convergence: the change in per capita GDP and GDP (in itself), both measured at 
constant prices. The latter two indicators help in identifying the effect of changes in relative 
prices/composition and population change, respectively, on measures of convergence based on 
relative real income at current PPP.  
Fifth, we amend earlier endeavours to identify the channels through which RER misalignments with a 
positive/negative sign may hurt/assist economic growth. Besides investments, already addressed in 
previous studies, we consider the relationship between misalignments and alternative indicators of 
external trade performance. Since the majority of EU-countries are very open, the “competitiveness-
channel” may provide an important link between misalignments and economic growth. 
Sixth, beyond results based on estimations of RER-misalignments, we also consider estimates relying 
on “wage-misalignments”, as interpreted by discreapancies between labour costs and productivity.  
Overall, our study is novel in estimating the effect of real exchange rate misalignment across 
different measures of the RER, the concept of economic growth and that of the level of 
development. Our results indicate that the contemporaneous extent of real exchange rate 
misalignment – as interpreted by the external relative price of GDP – is negatively associated with 
economic growth: a 10% over/undervaluation is accompanied by 0.2-0.7 percentage point 
lower/higher rate of growth across different specifications. This effect is substantial, considering the 
fact that the mean annual growth rate of GDP (per capita GDP) was 2.4% (2.3%) in the EU27 over the 
period covered by our analysis. Misalignments in internal RERs also affect growth, in some cases 
even more than those in external price levels, highlighting the role of relative prices in resource 
allocation. A robust finding of the study is that the negative growth effect of misalignment both in 
external price level and in internal relative prices is mainly attributable to countries operating under 
fixed exchange rate regime, that is, to Eurozone countries and CEEU countries with pegged exchange 
rates or currency-board arrangement. This finding is robust to the choice of growth indicator, the 
measure of relative level of development and the interpretation of the RER.  
Our results show that, in contrast with the common finding in the literature, the level of relative 
development does not influence the strength of the growth effect of misalignments. While external 
price level-based and internal relative price-based misalignments behave similarly on the aggregate 
sample, our findings are mixed regarding the symmetry with respect to the size and sign of the 
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misalignment. Specifically, in case of the external relative price level, overvaluation has stronger 
effect than undervaluation, and while larger overvaluations have an excessively negative growth 
effect, the positive effect of undervaluation diminishes with increasing size. The growth effect of 
internal relative price misalignment does not show this pattern.  
We address two possible channels through which RER misalignments might influence economic 
growth: international competitiveness and the investment rate. The aggregate effect of 
misalignments is significantly negative on both export market shares and the ratio of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP. This result indicates that both the competitiveness and the investment 
channel plays an important role in the growth effect of RER misalignments. 
As an extension, we analyse the relationship between growth and the misalignment of wages from 
productivity levels. Our results indicate that, similatly to RER misalignments, “wage misalignments” 
are also negatively associated with economic growth. 
Our results capture contemporaneous and one-year lagged effects of RER-misalignments, which are 
highly relevant for understanding growth and convergence in EU member-states in certain sub-
periods of the 21 years covered by our study, but these results do not enable us to draw conclusions 
about the long-term effects of misaligned price levels and relative prices. It is also important to stress 
that although our study carries important policy messages – in particular, mild real exchange rate 
undervaluations are positively, while overvaluations are negatively associated with growth and real 
economic convergence – the RER is an endogenous variable, which is not under direct policy control. 
However, there are several policy instruments for indirectly influencing the RER, even in countries 
operating under fixed exchange rates. Our results point to the importance of a growth strategy 
avoiding overvaluation on the one hand, and to the futility of aiming at excessive undervaluation, on 
the other. Rather than trying to achieve an undervalued RER, governments are advised to focus on 
improving the quality of institutions. As shown by our estimations, this is one of the important 
factors that actually matter in the longer term.  
We consider the results presented in this paper as a first step in our attempt to clarify the 
relationship between RER-misalignments and economic growth within the EU. As a next step, it is 
important to build a theorethical model capable of reproducing the empirical results reported in our 
study. As a continuation of our work, we also wish to address issues left open in the present study. 
Furthermore, the general results of our study need to be ammended by the analysis of individual 
country-experiences with respect to the evolution of the RER and economic convergence.  
The further part of the study is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the motivations and 
background of our work, including a selective review of the related literature. In section 3 we define 
the basic concepts applied in our analyses. Section 4, relying on these concepts, summarises the 
stylised facts underlying our econometric estimates. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, present 
quantitative estimates of misalignments and their effect of different measures economic growth. 
Section 7 briefly discusses the issue of wage misalignment; section 8 summarises and draws 
conclusions.  
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2. Background, motivations and a selective review of the literature 
2.1. Background and motivations  
Our study builds upon, and contributes to, a rich and prolific strand of research in international 
economics, namely the literature on the relationship between real exchange rate (RER) 
misalignments and economic growth. 
The notion that a positive correlation exists between levels of (changes in) RERs and levels of 
(changes in) economic development has a long tradition (see section 2.2.), but has first been 
statistically demonstrated, accompanied by a model-based explanation, in Balassa’s (1964) seminal 
article on the reappraisal of the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory of exchange rates. A part of the 
literature following this thread was occupied by questioning (e.g., Officer, 1976), or verifying (e.g., 
Kravis and Lipsey, 1983) the existence of the empirical regularity; another part of related works 
addressed the relevance of the productivity-based explanation provided by Balassa (and, 
independently from him, by Samuelson, 1964). The discussion on the relevance of the “productivity 
channel” has continued ever since its exposition.4  
An alternative line of research focused on the implications of exchange rate misalignments, in 
particular, the negative effects of overvaluations (alternatively defined) on economic growth in 
developing countries.5 Although there were some earlier attempts to combine the observed 
relationship between price levels and levels of economic development with differences in growth 
performances (in particular, Dollar, 1992), this line of analysis gained broader professional interest 
only in the late 2000s (Eichengreen, 2008; Rodrik, 2008).6  
While Rodrik’s article, demonstrating the negative/positive effect of overvaluations/undervaluations 
(interpreted as deviations from the relationship implied by relative price and income levels) on 
economic growth, received considerable attention and gave an impetus to discussion and further 
studies, two rarely quoted articles, published almost at the same time, made a similar case, based on 
analogous theoretical and empirical arguments. Galla (2008) showed that in developing countries 
misalignments are negatively related to growth, while Podkaminer (2008) presented European 
examples indicating that extended overvaluations harm economic growth. These examples 
demonstrate that the issue of RER-misalignment and growth was already “in the air” before the 
global economic and financial crisis of 2009.  
Recent studies (e.g., Habib et al., 2016) also found evidence that misalignments are negatively 
related to economic growth, but they also found, similarly to Rodrik, that these results hold for less 
developed countries and do not apply for countries at higher levels of development. This directly 
leads to the motivations of our research.  
One of our important motivations is to check the empirical validity of this commonly accepted finding 
by observing developments among EU-member states, a group including countries at both high and 
                                                          
4
 A thorough review of the related literature is provided by Devereux (2014). For a recent contribution, 
challenging the notion that higher productivity growth is accompanied by RER-appreciation, see Gubler and Sax 
(2017) 
5
 See e.g., Cavallo et al. (1990), Dollar (1992), Razin and Collins (1997), Benaroya and Janci (1999), Acemoglu et 
al. (2002), Fajnzylber et al. (2002).  
6
 It should be noted that while several endeavours had been made to explain the underperformance of 
particular developed economies by RER-overvaluations (see in particular Kaldor [1966 and 1971] on the UK and 
Corden [1984] on the “Dutch disease”), these interpretations of overvaluations, however, never referred to 
misalignments of RERs from levels implied by the level of development.  
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medium level of income. Except for Podkaminer (2008), Oblath and Szörfi (2008) and Oblath et al. 
(2015), no attempt, that we are aware of, has been made as yet to clarify the relationship between 
RER misalignments and growth within the EU. The analysis by Podkaminer was somewhat informal; 
while the econometric analyses in the latter two studies were rather rudimentary. In particular, they 
did not address problems involved by potential endogeneity, an issue taken up in the present study. 
A second motivation is related to the fact that almost all studies on misalignments and growth focus 
on the relationship between misalignments as interpreted by deviations of relative price levels of 
GDP from levels predicted by relative income, i.e., the misalignment of the external RER. This 
approach does not take into account an important channel through which misalignments may 
actually work, i.e. the internal relative price of services to goods – which may serve as a proxy for the 
relative price of non-tradables to tradables.  
Third, misalignments, especially their persistence, may be affected by the exchange rate regime. EU-
member states participating in the European Monetary Union (EMU) have fixed their nominal 
exchange rates against each other (Bulgaria and the Baltic countries have implicitly joined the system 
before actual participation), while other member states have maintained a flexible exchange rate 
regime. Therefore, the EU is a natural field for investigating the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes, misalignments and their effects.  
Fourth, the speed of real economic convergence of the new EU-member states of Central and East 
Europe (CEEU) is remarkably different. Do these differences have to do with misalignments as 
interpreted above, or they are related to other factors? Our study intends to contribute to the 
clarification of this issue as well. 
The last point leads to our fifth motivation: to go beyond the general patterns displayed by the 
regressions, and look at country-specific experiences. A pattern that holds for a group as a whole 
does not necessarily apply for individual countries. While observing country-specific developments is 
certainly not feasible in samples covering more than hundred countries (which is the general case in 
the related literature), it is not just feasible, but also necessary in the case of the EU. The overall 
results for the 27 countries should be interpreted in view of the fact they are actually very different.  
2.2. A selective review of the literature 
In the following we briefly review some of the main contributions to the literature on the 
relationship between the level of (changes in) the RER and economic development. The literature on 
the interpretation and measurement of RER-misalignments, as well as on their effect on growth, 
including details of the estimation methods, is reviewed in section 5.1. 
Paul Samuelson (1994) coined the close positive association between the price level of GDP and real 
per capita GDP the as the “Penn-effect”.7 He – as one of the contributors of the renowned Balassa-
Samuelson (BS) model – considered it important 30 years later to distinguish the observed statistical 
                                                          
7
 Samuelson referred to the results of international comparisons performed in the framework of the ICP project 
in which the University of Pennsylvania had a major role. The Penn World Table (PWT) constitutes a major 
statistical source for worldwide comparisons of real GDP and its components. The data indicate a close positive 
association between the level of real incomes and relative price levels of GDP. The existence of the Penn-effect 
contradicts a long-respected notion in international economics, namely the absolute version of the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) doctrine, which asserts that nominal exchange rates correspond to differences in general 
price levels. (See Cassel, 1922 on a classical exposition of the PPP-theory.) More precisely, the Penn-effect 
limits the scope of the absolute PPP-theory of exchange rates to countries at similar levels of economic 
development. (The Penn-effect implies that the PPP doctrine holds only if differences in real income levels are 
adjusted for.)  
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regularity (the Penn-effect) from one of its possible explanations, which is the BS-model.8 This 
important distinction is frequently overlooked, whereby the “BS-effect” is regularly used as a 
synonym of the Penn-effect. 9 
There are several layers of understanding/explaining the Penn-effect; here we refer only to two of 
these.10 One relates to the following question: the external relative price of which particular GDP-
aggregates is chiefly responsible for the observed effect? In this respect, there has been a broad 
consensus among economists and economic statisticians: the relative price of services (vs. goods or 
vs. GDP) increases in line with the level of economic development (for earlier works see e.g. Harrod, 
1933; Clark, 1940; Fourastié, 1947; Kuznets, 1971).  
The second concerns explanations of the observed effect. The most well-known is the BS model, 
which, building on rather restrictive assumptions, focuses on differences in productivity between 
goods (an approximation of tradables) and services (an approximation of nontradables). An 
alternative explanation was offered by Bhagwati (1984), who built his model on differences in factor 
endowments of the two sectors.  
There is, however, a long tradition of explanations from the demand side as well (in particular 
Fourastié, 1947), but there were several later attempts to this end (see e.g., Bergstrand 1991; 
Podkaminer, 2010a). Bergstrand’s argument was based on the assumption that services are “luxury 
goods” while tradable commodities are “necessities”. Therefore, as national income grows, the 
demand for nontradable services increases more than that for tradable goods; this leads to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Bergstrand built an empirically testable model to support this 
assertion. Using a sample of 21 countries, he distinguished the effects of three possible theoretical 
explanations for the different real exchange rate levels: his demand-side approach, the Balassa-
Samuelson model and the role of different capital-labor endowments based on Bhagwati (1984). His 
results supported the hypothesis that income has a significantly positive effect on the real exchange 
rate through higher demand for services even after controlling for productivity and capital-labor 
endowment differences between the tradable and the nontradable sector. This implies that, beside 
the supply-side, there is a demand-side channel responsible for the observed regularity. 
Regarding the catching-up process in the European Union, Égert (2010) also emphasized the 
importance of the demand-side channel. He found that the Balassa-Samuelson explanation hardly 
holds in this sample because of two reasons. First, the productivity growth in services was not far 
from that in the tradable sector in several new member states of the EU. In addition, the (nominal) 
share of nontradables is usually low in these countries. As a result, he found that the implied 
“Balassa-Samuelson effect” is very weak in new EU member-countries. 
Égert also tested the possible drivers of price level convergence with various econometric models. 
His results corroborated that the Balassa-Samuelson model was not an important explanation of the 
process. Regarding the nontradable sector, inflation showed a strong positive correlation with 
regulated service prices that usually account for a large part of the HICP in the new member states. 
House prices and commodity prices also proved to be important drivers of inflation. These results led 
                                                          
8
 The term “Balassa-Samuelson model” was suggested by Asea and Corden (1994) in their review of the related 
literature. For further reviews on alternative tests of the model, see e.g. Égert - Halpern - MacDonald (2005) 
and Tica and Druzic (2006)  
9
 For a discussion of the relationship between the Penn and the BS effect, see Pancaro (2011).  
10
 It should be noted that while the Penn-effect works among countries at considerably different levels of 
economic development, it does not appear to be significant within the most and the least developed group of 
countries; see Rogoff (1996) and Hassan (2011) on this point. In section 4 we verify this assertion  
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him to the inference that during the economic catching-up process higher incomes result in changes 
of the consumption structure of households towards higher quality goods and services. Therefore, 
price level convergence is due to developments in both the tradable and nontradable sector.  
Our study does not deal with alternative explanations; it simply considers the Penn-effect as a 
statistically firmly based stylized fact, which certainly holds for the EU27 in the period in our focus.11 
However, two points have to be made. The first concerns the implications of external and internal 
relative prices. For the Penn-effect to hold, it is a sufficient condition that the internal relative price 
of services to goods be higher in more developed countries than in less developed ones, while the 
external price level of goods may be the same. (Actually, the latter assumption was explicitly made in 
Balassa’s article.) However, all statistical sources confirm that not only services, but goods are also 
more expensive in countries at higher levels of development. 
This leads to the next point, the “dynamic” Penn-effect (see Ravallion, 2010). What are the major 
factors responsible for changes in price levels accompanying convergence in real incomes? Several 
studies have questioned the relevance of the dynamic version of the BS-model, calling attention to 
the fact that not only the increase in the external relative price of services but also that of goods 
have a major role in the catching up of price levels (often referred to as “structural inflation”).12 A 
more important, conceptual issue relates to the nature of the dynamic Penn effect. Over what time 
horizon do price levels change in response to changes in per capita incomes? Berka and Devereux 
(2013) show that there is a medium-term correspondence between the cross-country and the 
dynamic version of the Penn effect. This appears to contradict the findings of Podkaminer (2008), 
that short-term changes in GDP price levels are unrelated to changes in relative per capita real GDP 
levels. However, the apparent contradiction may be resolved by the possibility that the longer term 
relationship is based on “error correction”, whereby deviations from a common “European trend” 
may explain short-term changes in relative GDP price levels in Europe. This assumption is confirmed 
by our analyses. In contrast to Podkaminer (2008), our ECM regressions show that both one-year 
changes in relative per capita GDP and lagged deviations from the long term relationship influence 
the one-year change in GDP price level, however, the explanaority power of these variables is rather 
low (see Appendix, B).  
                                                          
11
 As emphasized by Samuelson (1994): “The Penn effect is an important phenomenon of actual history but not 
an inevitable fact of life.” Bergin-Glick-Taylor (2004) and Taylor and Taylor (2004) demonstrated that, 
historically, the existence of the Penn-effect is indeed recent: it did not exist in the early 1900-s and evolved 
(and strengthened) since the middle of the twentieth century.  
12
 See e.g. Darvas – Szapáry (2008). For a non-technical exposition of the related ideas, see Égert-Podpiera 
(2008).  
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3. Key concepts and accounting relationships 
In this section we first define the key concepts of the paper and clarify their accounting relationships. 
Next, we show how some of the analytical categories applied for international comparisons (in 
particular, goods and services) are related to concepts of the national accounts. The concept of 
constant-PPP based comparisons will also be clarified. 
3. 1. Concepts and definition of terms  
3.1.1. Comparative nominal, price and volume levels; external and internal relative prices 
In order to clarify the main concepts of our study, we depart from two decompositions of the 
comparative nominal level of per capita GDP of a particular country. The term comparative refers to 
the fact that an item/aggregate (e.g., per capita GDP) is being measured relative to another country 
or to a group of countries; therefore the terms “comparative” and “relative” are to be used 
interchangeably. The term nominal, in turn, indicates that an item/aggregate is expressed at current 
prices (i.e., it is not deflated by a price index), irrespective of whether it is measured in national 
currency units, or converted into a common currency via the current exchange rate. 
To connect the conceptual clarification to the quantitative analyses of our paper, our decompositions 
refer to a member state of the European Union (EU), and the benchmark for the comparisons is the 
average of the EU. 
The decomposition of the “distance” in nominal per capita GDP of member-state i from that of the 
EU-average is conceptually similar to how nominal changes over time can be decomposed into 
changes in prices and quantities (volumes) within a particular country.  
In country i the change in nominal per capita GDP (measured at current prices) between period t-1 
and t can be written as follows: 
𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
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𝑖
  (1) 
where Ngdp and POP, respectively, indicate GDP at current prices (i.e., nominal GDP) and population 
size; t and t-1 refer to the current and base period; Pgdp and Qgdp denote the price and quantity (at 
constant prices) of GDP. The term on the left-hand side indicates the nominal change in per capita 
GDP in country i; the first term on the right-hand side is a price index (the GDP-deflator), while 
second is the change in per capita GDP measured at constant prices (a volume index).13 
In this study we use Q for indicating real changes over time. We shall use V for expressing real 
”distances” between countries at a point in time. The relevance of this distinction will become 
apparent when discussing changes in real distances over time (section 3.1.).  
Turning to international comparisons, formula (1), expressing changes over time, can be interpreted 
as follows for comparing country i to the EU average in period t (to simplify the expression, the time 
index is omitted): 
𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑛𝑐
𝑖 /𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖
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  (2) 
where Ngdp(i, nc) is the GDP measured at current prices in country i, expressed in national currency 
(nc), and Ngdp(EU, eur) is the GDP of the European Union at current prices, expressed in euros. The 
                                                          
13
 As the expression serves only for illustration, we skip the discussion of methodological issues related to the 
construction of national price and volume indices.  
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term on the left hand side shows the ratio of per capita GDP in county i, expressed in the country’s 
currency to that of the EU-average in euros. This ratio, by itself, has no economic meaning 
whatsoever. However, its decomposition contains two important pieces of information.  
The first term on the right-hand side is a spatial (cross-county) price index, while the second one is a 
spatial volume index. The spatial price index [Pgdp (i, nc)/Pgdp(EU, eur)] is the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) for GDP in country i, vs. the EU average. It shows how many units of domestic currency 
has the same purchasing power over a notional unit of GDP in country i, as one euro has over a 
notional unit of GDP in the average of the EU. 
One of the major applications of PPPs is shown by second term on the right-hand side of (2). If the 
nominal comparative per capita GDP (the left-hand side) is divided by the PPP, the second term on 
the right-hand side is obtained, namely the volume (the “real” magnitude) of per capita GDP of 
country i, relative to the EU-average. This spatial volume index is an indication of the relative size of 
the basket consisting of per capita GDP in country i as compared to the reference country/region. In 
the following, we refer to this ratio as the volume level index of per capita GDP, to be denoted as 
VLCgdp.14 This indicator is generally considered to reflect the level of economic development or, 
alternatively, the level of real income of country i, as compared to the reference country/region.15 
The difficulty with interpreting expression (2) is that the numeraire (the unit of currency) in the 
numerator is different from the one in the denominator. Therefore, both sides of equation (2) have 
to be divided by the exchange rate (E), in order to decompose the relative nominal level of per capita 
GDP expressed in a common currency into a spatial price and a spatial volume index. In expression 
(3), the first term on the right hand side (the PPP for GDP divided by the nominal exchange rate) is 
the price level index of GDP, to be denoted as PLgdp. It shows how much higher/lower the general 
price level of country i is relative to the EU-average, expressed in a common currency. The second 
term on the right hand side is the same as in (2). 
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where E and Ngdp(i, eur), respectively, denote the nominal exchange rate and per capita GDP in 
country i expressed in euros; the rest of the notations are the same as in (2). 
To give an idea of the empirical relationship between the three variables in the expression above, 
Figure 3.1 shows the price level of GDP and the volume level of per capita GDP as a function of the 
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 The actual magnitude of VLCgdp depends on the choice of the reference country/region, which differs 
among different databases. The four important sources containing international real comparisons across 
countries are the Penn World Tables (PWT, 2016), the World Bank (2016), the OECD (2016) and the Eurostat 
(2016). The last one is the source of the data used in our quantitative analyses, where the EU average, or the 
average of a sub-group of countries within the EU can be chosen as a reference.  
15
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nominal level of per capita GDP for 27 EU-member states in 2014. For reasons to be explained below, 
the benchmark, just as in other comparisons in this study, is the EU15, rather than the EU28.16 
Figure 3.1: The relationship between nominal and real per capita GDP and the price level of GDP in 
member-states of the EU in 2014 (EU15 = 100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 3.1 indicates a very close positive relationship among the three variables within the EU. The 
lower (higher) the relative nominal per capita GDP (in euros), the lower (higher) is the relative price 
level (in euros), as well as the relative real per capita GDP (in PPS).17 Moreover, the slope of the 
regression lines of the latter two variables is practically identical and the lines are very close to each 
other, suggesting a strong correlation between them. The year 2014 serves for illustration; a similarly 
close association would show for any other year included in our database covering the period 1995-
2016.18 We shall return to the implications of the phenomenon displayed by Figure 1 later on; now 
an important amendment to the foregoing decompositions is in order. 
We departed from the relationship connecting relative nominal and real per capita GDP and the PPP 
for (the relative price level of) GDP simply because the international comparison of levels of 
development (real incomes) is the most frequent application of PPPs. We could also have departed 
from, e.g., the international comparison of levels of per capita real consumption or real fixed capital 
formation. Differences between nominal and real levels of these aggregates are just as relevant, as 
for per capita GDP.  
However, with respect to the later items, their own PPPs (price level indices) have to be applied for 
cross-country comparisons of volumes (levels in real terms). This implies that there is no such thing 
as “the” PPP, because each component and sub-component of GDP has its own PPP. While, for cross-
country nominal comparisons of different items in a common currency there is a single deflator, i.e., 
the exchange rate, this does not hold for real comparisons between countries. In the latter case, each 
                                                          
16
 The EU15 refers to the average of the member-states having belonged to the EU before the enlargement in 
2004. 
17
 The Eurostat uses a special type of PPP, the PPS (purchasing power parity standard). PPS is defined so that 1 
PPS has the same purchasing power as 1 euro has with respect to the average of (i) all EU member-states (the 
EU28), (ii) the EU27 (the EU28 less Croatia), or (iii) the EU15. Depending on the variant of PPS, the average price 
level of the respective group of countries is the same, whether measured in euro or PPS. Since the time series 
for certain items expressed in PPS-EU28 are relatively short, our analyses rely on data measured in PPS-EU15.  
18
 Actually, 2014 is the last year when all of the present member states (less Luxembourg) are taken into 
consideration in our database applied for empirical analysis. We chose to omit GDP-data for Ireland regarding 
the years 2015 and 2016 due to a jump of 26 percent in the country’s real GDP in 2015. This increase is related 
to certain accounting methods of the SNA, rather than to an actual jump in the country’s real economic 
performance.  
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item needs to be deflated by its own PPP (price level index) to ensure the comparability of the per 
capita volumes of the respective items.  
In the following we refer to the price level index of an item (e.g. PLgdp, etc.) as the external relative 
price of the respective item.  
Figure 2 illustrates the importance of distinguishing between the overall external relative price level 
(PLgdp), and two of its components mentioned above (the external relative price of consumption and 
that of gross fixed capital formation). The latter two are shown in function of the external relative 
price of GDP, with the EU15 as a reference. 
Figure 3.2: The relationship between the external relative price level of GDP, gross capital formation 
and consumption in member-states of the EU in 2014 (EU15 = 100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
As shown by the figure, in EU-countries having lower comparative GDP price levels, consumption is 
relatively cheap and investments are relatively expensive; while the opposite holds for most of the 
countries having higher GDP price levels. This phenomenon calls attention to the importance of 
internal relative prices. 
3.1.2. Internal relative prices 
We define the internal relative price of two aggregates (components of GDP) as the ratio of their 
external relative prices. The exact name for this ratio should be the “deviation of the internal price 
ratio from that of the reference region”. However, since there is no such thing as the “internal 
relative price level” of two aggregates in a particular country, and therefore, at a point in time this 
ratio can only be interpreted in international comparison, we simply call it an internal relative price. 
Still, it has to be kept in mind that this indicator, similarly to any indicator involving international 
comparisons, depends on the choice of reference region. 
For the purposes of our study, the most important internal relative price is that of services to goods, 
i.e., 
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where RP denotes the internal relative price, PL is the external relative price, while s and g, indicate 
services and goods.19 
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 Actually, the reason for choosing the EU15, rather than the EU28 as a benchmark for comparisons in this 
study is that that PPP-data for the new member states with respect to services and goods are unavailable 
before the year 2004 with the EU28 average as a reference, while they are available beginning 1999 with the 
average of the EU15 as a reference.  
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This ratio can either be considered as a proxy of the relative price of non-tradables to tradables (in 
the spirit of the Balassa-Samuelson model), or as an indicator on its own right (as suggested by the 
demand-side explanations of the relationship between RPsg and per capita GDP).20 Whatever the 
status and explanation for the behaviour of RPsg, its relationship with nominal per capita GDP is very 
similar to that of the external relative price level of GDP (PLgdp) – as shown by Figure 3. 
Figure 3.3: The relationship between nominal GDP, the price level of GDP and the internal relative 
price of services to goods in member-states of the EU in 2014 (EU15 = 100) 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
Figure 3.3, similarly to the two previous figures, shows cross-section relationships relative to the 
EU15 average for the year 2014. Just as PLgdp, RPsg is also closely positively correlated with per 
capita GDP; the slopes are similar, but the dispersion around the cross section trend is somewhat 
larger in the case of the latter.  
3.2. Methodological issues 
We address three methodological issues related to the interpretation of the internal relative price of 
services to goods. The first concerns the relationship of the two aggregates behind RPsg with the 
categories of the System of National Accounts (SNA). The second relates to the aggregation method 
underlying our data, while the third concerns the analytical vs. empirical relationship between PLgdp 
and RPsg. 
3.2.1. Goods and services vs. SNA aggregates  
“Goods” and “services” are analytical categories specifically constructed for the International 
Comparison Programme (ICP), based on PPPs.21 Since the SNA does not recognise these categories, it 
should be useful to clarify their relationship with the more familiar aggregates of the national 
accounts. 
The basic identity for the expenditure side of GDP is: 
GFCF + dST+ C + NX = GDP  (4) 
where GFCF, dST, C and NX, respectively, denote gross fixed capital formation, change in stocks, final 
consumption (private and public) and net exports. 
The identity connecting the two analytical categories of the ICP with GDP aggregates (also 
interpreted from the expenditure side): 
GO + SE + NPA + dST + NX =GDP (5) 
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where GO, SE and NPA, respectively, denote total goods, total services and “net purchases abroad” 
(approximately: the inverse of net revenues from tourism); the rest of the notations are the same as 
in (4). As shown by identity (5), there are three items driving “wedges” between the sum of goods 
and services on the one hand, and GDP, on the other: net purchases abroad, changes in stocks and 
net exports. This implies that the aggregate of goods and services does not correspond to total 
domestic demand (DD) either, since the latter includes, while the former excludes NPA and dST: 
GO + SE + NPA + dST =GDP – NX = DD  (5a) 
What the sum of goods and services exactly corresponds to (at current prices) is the sum of gross 
fixed capital formation and final consumption (i.e., domestic demand less changes in stocks) minus 
net purchases abroad: 
GO + SE = GDP – (NPA + NX + dST) = GFCF + C – NPA  (5c) 
The important point is that the sum of the two items in our focus does not add up to the 
conventional final macroeconomic aggregates (GDP or domestic demand) even at current prices. As a 
result of the aggregation method used for constructing the data published in the Eurostat PPP-
database, our major statistical source, the additivity of the items shown in the formulae above does 
not hold when they are measured at international prices (i.e., at PPPS).  
3.2.2. Reference PPPs and aggregation methods 
PPPs are not calculated for the three items separating the sum of goods and services from GDP; they 
are converted at so-called reference PPPs. The reference PPP for NX and NPA is the exchange rate 
(thus, PLnx = PLnpa =100), while for changes in stocks it is the average PPP for consumer and capital 
goods.  
However, even in possession of this information, it is not possible to empirically reconstruct from our 
data the overall external relative price (PLgdp) as a weighted average of the external relative price of 
goods (PLg), services (PLs) and that of the remaining three items. The reason lies in the actual 
aggregation method for constructing aggregates measured at PPPs. Without entering the details, we 
note that there are two internationally endorsed aggregation methods: the so-called EKS (Éltető – 
Köves – Sultz) and the GK (Geary – Khamis) approach. The former one is applied by the Eurostat and 
the OECD, which is more suitable for comparing volume/price levels of individual aggregates across 
countries, but the aggregates obtained by this method are non-additive. The GK method yields 
additive results, which, therefore, are suitable for the international comparison of (volume and price) 
structures, but have several shortcomings when applied for the comparison of levels.22  
International data based on GK-PPPs used to be published by the OECD as supplementary 
information, but only for every third year (for the so-called “benchmark years” of PPP-based 
comparisons), and 2008 is the last year for which this type of information is available. This implies 
that the data published by the Eurostat on an annual basis allows us only an approximate 
reconstruction of the “actual” relationship between PLgdp and its weighted components. It also 
implies that the relative price of services to goods (RPsg), as calculated from the annual Eurostat-
data (based on EKS-aggregation), is an approximation of the “true” relative price of the two items 
(which would correspond to a relative price based on GK-aggregation). 
To check whether or not the aggregation method has a considerable effect on the size of RPsg, we 
compared the two ratios for 2008, the last year for which both are available (Figure 4). 
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 See the methodological manual on PPPs for the respective details (Eurostat – OECD, 2012, pp. 235-247).  
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Figure 3.4: The relative price of services to goods in the EU based on GK (horizontal axis) and EKS 
(vertical axis) aggregation in 2008 (EU28 =100) 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD PPP-data  
Figure 4 shows that there is a very close correspondence between the two measures of the internal 
relative price of services to goods within the EU (R2 = 0,99), indicating that the relative price based on 
EKS aggregation serves as an adequate proxy for the superior (but recently unavailable) relative price 
based on GK aggregation – for the EU as a whole. This reassuring empirical result leads to the 
approximate analytical decomposition of the overall external relative price level. 
BOX 3.1: The decomposition of the external relative price level of GDP  
The economic relationship between the external relative price level (PL15_GDP) and the relative 
price of services and goods (internal relative price, RP_S_G) can be understood by the standard 
decomposition of the logarithmic transformation of the external relative price. This decomposition 
rests on the distinction between tradables and nontradables. Tradables are traded internationally, 
hence are exposed to the price competition of foreign goods. Nontradables do not take part in the 
international trade, hence their prices are determined by domestic macroeconomic factors. In 
empirical analyses, tradables are often approximated by total goods and the nontradables by total 
services.  
The price level (in logarithm) at home and abroad can be written as a weighted average of the 
relative logarithmic price levels of tradable and nontradables: 
log (𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) = (1 − 𝛼𝑖)log (𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) + (𝛼𝑖)log (𝑃𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑐
𝑖 )    (1) 
log (𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 ) = (1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑈)log (𝑃𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 ) + (𝛼𝐸𝑈)log (𝑃𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 )  (2) 
The relative price level is the ratio of the national price level and the price level of the foreign country 
expressed in the home currency:  
log (𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝) = log (𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) − log (𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 ) − 𝐸  (3) 
Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) yields:  
log(𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝) = [log(𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) − 𝑃𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 − 𝐸] + [𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑐
𝑖 − 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) − 𝛼𝐸𝑈(log (𝑃𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 ) −
log (𝑃𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟
𝐸𝑈 ))]      (4) 
The relative price level of the GDP depends on the relative price level of goods and the deviation of 
the internal relative price from that of the EU. The second term is usually called the internal real 
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exchange rate in the literature on exchange rates. The internal real exchange rate can be loosely 
interpreted as our internal relative price indicator (RP_P_S) 
The above relationship can equally be written as the sum of relative nontradable prices plus the 
internal relative price differential of goods over services. However, equation (4) better fits the 
Balassa-Samuelson model, according to which tradable prices are equalized across countries due to 
international competition. Consequently, the overall price level can differ only as a result of diverging 
nontradable prices. Under this assumption, the external relative price level and the internal real 
exchange rate would be the same. Based on this consideration, according to the traditional 
approach, the movements in the overall external relative price level are mainly explained by the 
domestic price movements. In practice, the price of tradables are not equalized between countries 
for many reasons (e.g. segmented consumer markets of tradables, trading costs, transportation 
costs, nontradable content of goods, different baskets, incomplete and sluggish pass-through of 
nominal exchange rate changes etc.), consequently, the external relative price level of the GDP and 
the internal real relative price never coincide. Based on these considerations, as well as the 
observation of a high correlation between nominal and real exchange rates in countries with flexible 
exchange rates, the New Open Economy Models (e.g. Obstfeld - Rogoff, 1996) focus on the role of 
the external relative price level of tradables. In the next chapter, we will show the role of the relative 
price of goods of services and the internal relative prices in the differences in overall relative price 
level. 
This textbook decomposition serves as an illustration and does not correspond to our variables for 
multiple reasons. First, as indicated above, the GDP includes three additional items besides goods 
and services: net exports, changes in stocks, net purchases abroad. Second, the aggregation method 
and the weights of different items are different in the PPP statistics. The textbook decomposition 
takes the national price level as a starting point (as a geometric average goods and services prices), 
while the PPP aggregates the relative price level of goods and services with a Fisher index. Third, the 
weights of the different components differ as a result of the EKS methodology.23 
 
3.3. Comparisons over time: current vs. constant PPPs 
PPSs serve for real (volume and relative price) comparisons across countries at a point in time. The 
change in per capita GDP measured at current PPPs between two periods relative to a reference 
group (e.g. the EU15) reflects several factors other than the change in the relative volume of per 
capita GDP. These include the effect of changes in relative prices, changes in composition, as well as 
the effect of methodological revisions in cross-country comparisons.  
However, for the purposes of several types of analyses, it is important to identify the “pure” effect of 
relative volume changes on the comparative level of incomes, necessitating comparisons at constant 
PPPs.24 This involves the selection of a base year, in which the relative position of countries is 
measured at current PPPs. Measuring relative volume changes by volume indices taken from the 
national accounts data of the respective countries, and combining the ratios of the national volume 
indices to that of the reference country with comparative positions in the base year, we obtain 
comparative positions measured at constant PPPs and prices of the base year.  
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 See Eurostat –OECD (2012) 
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 See e.g., Dey-Chowdhury (2007) on the methodology and interpretation of comparisons at current and 
constant PPPs. 
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In the following, per capita GDP at constant PPPs is denoted as QVLCgdp[t; (t-1)], where Q refers to a 
constant-price comparison over time, VL refers to a volume-level comparison between countries, the 
index t refers to the year of comparison, wile (t-1) indicates the base year. Thus, per capita GDP in 
county i, in year t, measured at constant PPP (and prices) of year (t-1), relative to the EU average can 
be written as  
𝑄𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑡;(𝑡−1)
𝑖
𝑄𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡;(𝑡−1)
𝐸𝑈 =
𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1
𝑖
𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1
𝐸𝑈 ∗
𝑄𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝑖 𝑄𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1
𝑖⁄
𝑄𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝐸𝑈 𝑄𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1
𝐸𝑈⁄
 (6) 
where VLCgdp indicates per capita GDP measured at current PPPs and prices, and QCgdp refers to 
per capita GDP measured at constant (domestic) prices. The indicator on the left hand side of (6) is 
affected only by comparative volume changes relative to the base year, and unlike cross-period 
comparisons of data at current PPPs, it is unaffected by changes in relative prices, composition and 
methodology. The annual level of this indicator, however, may strongly be affected by the choice of 
the base year. This practically means that over the years 1995-2016, the distance of county i from the 
EU-average with respect to per capita GDP measured at constant PPPs may substantially differ, 
depending on whether 1995, 2016 or another year in between is chosen as a base period. 
The lesson is that there is no easy way to overcome the difficulty involved in simultaneous volume 
comparisons both across countries and over time.25  
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 This difficulty, however, is not specific to international comparisons. Similar problems arise in the case of the 
comparison of e.g., the investment rate of a particular country between two periods. If the relative price of 
investments to GDP changes, the comparison of investment rates at current prices may be misleading. But 
there is no way of measuring “the” real investment rate: it depends on the price structure of the year chosen 
as a base.  
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Summing up: key concepts 
Our key concepts, the corresponding indicators, their explanation and applications are summarised 
in table 3.1. Their statistical sources are given in Appendix I. 
Table 3.1: Summary of the main concepts and the corresponding indicators 
 
Note: The external relative price of an aggregate is defined as the ratio of the PPP of the respective item to the 
exchange rate.  
Concept Indicator Interpretation Application
VLC15_gdp
Per capita GDP at current PPP relative to 
the EU15
Measuring relative real income at a 
point in time 
VLW15_gdp
GDP per employed at current PPP relative 
to the EU15
Measuring relative productivity at a 
point in time 
PL15_gdp
External price level of GDP relative to the 
EU15
PL15_s
External price level of services relative to 
the EU15
PL15_g
External price level of goods relative to 
the EU15
PL15_s_g
Internal relative price of services to 
goods (PL15_s/PL15_g)
Comparing internal price structures 
relative to the EU15 
QVLC15_gdp
Per capita GDP at constant (2010) PPP 
relative to the EU15
Measuring changes in per capita real 
income relative to the EU15
QVL15_gdp
Per capita GDP at constant (2010) PPP 
relative to the EU15, asssuming constant 
(2010) population size
Measuring the partial effect of real GDP-
change relative to the EU15
QVLW15_gdp
GDP per employed at constant (2010) PPP 
relative to the EU15
Measuring changes in real productivity 
relative to the EU15
Relative price level at constant PPP QPL15_gdp
External price level of GDP relative to the 
EU15 at constant (2010) PPP
Comparing changes in price levels 
relative to the EU15
Per capita GDP at constant prices QC_gdp
Chain-linked volume of GDP/pop at 
prices of 2010
Measuring volume changes in per capita 
GDP
GDP at constant prices Q_gdp
Chain-linked volume of GDP at prices of 
2010
Measuring volume changes in GDP
Relative level of development at 
current PPP
Relative price level
Relative level of development at 
constant PPP
Comparing price levels relative to the 
EU15 
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4. Stylised facts: an overview of the statistical evidence  
In this section we present the main stylised facts underlying and motivating our quantitative analyses 
to be presented in sections 5 and 6. These, first and most importantly, concern the close positive 
relationship between the level of economic development (measured by per capita GDP, or, 
alternatively, by GDP per persons employed) on the one hand, and price levels, as well as price 
structures, on the other. Second, we show that with respect to changes in these variables, the 
association is rather weak in the short run, but a strong positive relationship holds in the medium-to 
longer run. A third group of stylised facts relates to the existence of convergence in real incomes, 
productivity, price levels and price structures among member-states of the EU over most of the two 
decades in our focus, i.e., the years between 1995 and 2016. However, since the international 
economic and financial crisis in 2009, real economic convergence slowed down significantly, and 
convergence in price levels/structures has stalled. 
4.1. The association between economic development and prices in the EU 
4.1.1 Levels: real incomes, general price levels, price patterns and internal relative prices 
We first demonstrate that the “brute fact”26 of a positive correlation between real incomes (per 
capita GDP at PPP) and price levels of GDP holds very strongly for EU-member-countries. We 
continue by observing the association between the level of income and prices of two major 
aggregates within GDP, i.e., that of services and goods. Third, we turn to the relationship between 
the level of income and the relative price of the latter two aggregates.  
Figure 4.1 shows the association between the price level of GDP and per capita GDP in 27 EU-
member states relative to the EU15, based on the pooled cross section of the observations for the 
period 1995-2016.  
Figure 4.1: The relationship between the price level of GDP and per capita GDP (measured at PPP) 
within the EU (pooled cross-section, 1995-2016; EU15=100) 
Left pane: original data; right pane: log-log transformation of the data  
 
Notations: PL15_GDP: the price level of GDP; VLC_GDP: per capita GDP measured at PPP (both relative to the 
EU15) 
Source: Eurostat 
The LHS of the figure indicates that the association between the two variables is indeed rather close 
(R2 = 0.87) and the coefficient of per capita GDP suggests that one percentage point higher (lower) 
real income level involves roughly 0.9 percentage points higher (lower) GDP price level. In our 
quantitative analyses we shall rely on the log-log transformation of the variables (see the RHS of the 
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figure), wherein both the strength of the relationship and the coefficient of real income is very 
similar to those shown by LHS.27  
Box 4.1: The PWT 9.0 on price and per capita income levels relative to the US in 2014 
In order to give an idea of the global relationship between GDP price levels and relative incomes, as 
compared to the relationship between these variables within the EU, we draw on the latest version 
of the Penn World Tables (PWT, 2017). The data for 2014 (the last year for which information is 
available) covers 182 countries, but we considered the 147 countries with a population size above 1 
million.  
Figure B4.1.1: The relationship between the (log) price level of GDP and (log) per capita GDP at PPP in 
147 countries relative to the US in 2014 
 
Source: own calculations based on PWT (2017) 
In our sample for 2014, consisting of almost 150 countries, the elasticity of the relative price level 
with respect to relative income is 0.23 (significant at 1%), with a R2 of 0.41. This result is very similar 
to other findings in the literature, based on a similar sample of countries, covering longer periods, 
generally relying on panel data, but ending before 2014 (the results of earlier studies are reviewed in 
section 5.1). An elasticity around 0.25 can be considered as a robust finding over longer periods and 
large international samples, consisting of countries at low, medium and high level of economic 
development.  
As shown by figure B4.1.2, the pattern reflecting the relationship between price levels and relative 
incomes among the 25 EU-countries included in our sample based on the PWT28 is similar to the 
world-wide pattern in the sense that there is a positive relationship between the price and income 
level relative to the US. However, both the elasticity of the price level (0.89) and the R2 (0.80) is 
significantly higher within the EU than among countries included in the broad sample. This 
comparison supports our assertion (see section 1) that the close economic integration of EU 
member-states contributes to a closer association between price and income levels, rather than to 
the equalisation of price levels of countries at different levels of economic development.  
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 Berka and Devereux (2013) demonstrated the close association of price and income levels within the EU for 
the period 1995-2009. 
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 Since the population of Cyprus and Malta is below 1 million, they are not included in our sample. 
y = 0,2262x + 3,3545
R² = 0,4112
3,0
3,2
3,4
3,6
3,8
4,0
4,2
4,4
4,6
4,8
5,0
0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0 5,0 6,0
ln(pl_gdp)
ln(vlc_us_gdp)
27 
 
Figure B4.1.2: The relationship between the (log) price level of GDP and (log) per capita GDP at PPP in 
25 EU countries relative to the US in 2014 
 
Source: own calculations based on PWT (2017) 
It is worth noting that the exclusion/inclusion of the EU25 into the PWT sample makes a difference 
for the global pattern. By excluding the EU (shrinking the sample to 122 countries), the elasticity falls 
from 0.23 to 0.18 and the R2 comes down from 0.41 to 0.29. This indicates that the pattern 
characterising the EU has a significant impact on the measured global relationship between price and 
income levels. 
As noted by Rogoff (1996), the “Penn-effect” does not hold for countries at similar levels of 
development.29 This point has been made, specifically with respect to low-income countries, by 
Hassan (2011) as well. Our calculations confirm this observation: moving from the lower end of the 
scale upwards, the association between price and income levels becomes significantly positive, if 
countries with incomes reaching at least 30 percent of the US level are considered. Moving from the 
other end of the scale “downwards”, the relationship becomes significantly positive if countries at (or 
below) 40 percent of the US level of income are taken into consideration. In other words, the “Penn-
effect” does not appear to have worked for the group of countries below (above) 30 (40) percent of 
the US income level. Note that these thresholds apply for the year 2014 on a sample of 147 
countries, but by choosing different years and other selection criteria for the sample, the thresholds 
may naturally change.  
As pointed out in section 1, and to be further developed in section 5, there are grounds for 
interpreting upward/downward deviations from the regression line (the residuals of the regression) 
shown by figure 4.1 as indications of misalignments of the external price level of GDP, implying 
over/undervaluation of the real exchange rate (RER). It should immediately be added, however, that 
figure 4.1 serves as a simple illustration of our approach to interpreting and measuring 
misalignments. In our quantitative analyses we shall observe the relationship between price levels 
and relative productivity as well, and use controls (e.g., openness, government consumption etc.) for 
quantifying alternative measures of RER-misalignment.  
Next, we turn to the external price level of two broad aggregates within GDP: that of services and 
goods.  
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 „.. whereas the relationship between income and prices is quite striking over the full data set, it is far less 
impressive when one looks either at the rich (industrialized) countries as a group, or at developing countries as 
a group." Rogoff (1976), p. 660. 
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Figure 4.2. The external relative price of services and goods as a function of per capita GDP: pooled 
cross-section, 1999-2016 (EU15 =100) 
 
Notations: PL15_SERV: external price level of services; PL15_GOOD:  
External price level of goods (both relative to the EU15) 
Source: Eurostat 
The external relative price of both categories increases along with real income, but the regression 
line regarding services is significantly steeper than for goods (the coefficients are 1,11 and 0,61 
respectively, while R2 is almost identical for the two, around 0,85). The scatterplots clearly confirm 
the finding of previous studies regarding the EU: both services and goods are cheaper in countries at 
lower levels of development than in more affluent ones, but the former are yet even cheaper.30 As an 
aside, the figure also shows that the assumption of full international price equalisation of goods 
(underlying traditional models of trade and exchange rate determination) does not hold in practice 
for the EU.31 
The latter observation, however, is not central from our point of view, since what actually matters 
for the purposes of the further analysis is the internal relative price of services to goods (RP_SG), as 
defined in section 3.32 As shown by figure 4.3, this particular internal relative price, just as the 
external price level of the items in both the nominator and the denominator of the indicator, is an 
increasing function of real income.  
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 SeeBerka and Devereux (2013). The difference is that while Berka and Devereux rely on the distinction 
between nontradables and tradables, we keep to the expenditure-side categories of the PPP database, i.e., 
services and goods.  
31
 If prices were equalized across countries, the regression line expressing the relative price of goods as a 
function of relative per capita GDP would be horizontal. 
32
 To remind: RP_S_G = PL_SERV/PL_GOOD, i.e., the internal relative price of services to goods corresponds to 
the ratio of the external relative price of the respective items. 
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Figure 4.3: The internal relative price of services to goods as a function of per capita GDP: pooled 
cross-section, 1999-2016 (EU15 =100) 
LHS: original data; RHS: log-log transformation of the data 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
Here again, the association is rather close and the linear regression on the left pane shows that 1 
percentage point higher (lower) level of real income entails about three-fourth of a percentage point 
higher (lower) internal relative price of services to goods – regarding the EU on average over the 
period 1999-2016. The relationship between proportional levels, as shown by the right pane, is 
similarly close and the coefficient is also similar. We consider the regression line shown by the RHS of 
figure 4.3. as an alternative expression of the real exchange rate (based on internal relative prices) 
consistent with economic fundamentals, and thus, an alternative point of reference for measuring 
exchange rate misalignments.  
Finally, we show that the external relative price of GDP and the internal relative price of services to 
goods are closely related to each other (see figure 4.4). Indeed, the latter appears to be an important 
explanatory variable of the former.  
Figure 4.4: The external relative price of GDP as a function of the internal relative price of services to 
goods: pooled cross-section, 1999-2016 (EU15 =100) 
Left pane: original data; right pane: log-log transformation of the data 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
Figure 4.5 displays developments in external relative price levels and their components in individual 
countries. The figure demonstrates a strong co-movement between the internal relative price of 
services to goods and the external relative price level of GDP in the majority of EU countries. 
However, the external relative price of goods is far from being flat (as implied by the Balasssa-
Samuelson model), moreover in some countries it exhibits stronger co-movement with the external 
relative price level of GDP than with the the internal relative price.  
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Figure 4.5: The external relative price level of GDP, that of goods and the internal relative price of 
services to goods in EU-countries between 1995 and 2016 (EU15=100) 
 
Summarising the foregoing review of stylised facts regarding levels, we have demonstrated that 
there is a very close correspondence between the level of incomes, external relative price levels and 
internal relative prices within the EU. We have shown that economic integration does not result in 
the equalisation of external price levels or/and internal price patterns among countries at different 
level of development. On the contrary, the major effect of economic integration is that differences in 
both external price levels and internal relative prices tend to closely correspond to differences in real 
incomes. 
Given these close relationships, it makes sense to inquire, as our study does: what are the 
implications of deviations from the common regression line (alternatively defined) for individual 
countries? As to be tested in section 6, a position below (above) the regression line may result in a 
relatively higher (lower) per capita real income growth, or/and a relatively higher (lower) increase in 
the general price level –accompanied by a higher (lower) increase in the relative price of services to 
goods in the next period. In the following, we turn to the stylised facts reflecting changes over time. 
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4.1.2 Changes over time 
The close cross-section association between the variables considered does not apply for their short-
term dynamics. As shown by figure 4.5.1, although annual changes in relative external/internal 
relative prices and real incomes are not totally independent from one another, the relationship 
regarding short-term dynamics does not resemble the close correlation observed in cross-section 
comparisons (compare the figures below with see figures 4.1 and 4.3. ECM regressions in Appendix B 
demonstrate the weak but significant relationship between short term changes in relative prices and 
incomes). 
Figure 4.5.1: The relationship between annual changes in external (left pane: 1995-2016) and internal 
(right pane: 1999-2016) relative prices and changes in per capita GDP  
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
A possible explanation for the apparent detachment of short-term comparative dynamics from 
comparative levels is that the variables in our focus are cointegrated. This assertion, to be formally 
tested, implies that if the position of a country in any given year is below/above the point suggested 
by the longer-term relationship, changes in external/internal relative prices are expected to be jointly 
affected by changes in both real incomes and the direction/magnitude of deviations from the 
regression lines expressing their long-term relationship with the level of income. Furthermore, 
changes in the level of income are also affected by deviations from the longer-term trend shown by 
the pooled cross-section regression line. In addition, relative price and relative per capita GDP levels 
might be affected by different shocks. These complex relationships are not likely to result in a short-
term co-movement of the variables. 
It is worth noting that the relationship between annual changes in the external relative price of GDP 
and those in the internal relative prices of services to goods appears to be somewhat closer than the 
ones shown by the figure above.  
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Figure 4.5.2: The relationship between annual changes in the external relative price of GDP and the 
internal relative price of goods to services between 1999 and2016 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
Regarding longer-term changes, the overall picture is quite different: growth rates at a span of 
roughly 15-20 years are rather closely correlated (see figure 4.6.1).  
Figure 4.6.1: Annual mean growth rate of the external relative price of GDP (left pane, 1995-2016), 
the internal relative price of services to goods (right pane, 1999-2016) and per capita GDP at PPP, as 
compared to the EU15 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data  
As shown by figure 4.6.1, the longer-term relationship between changes in the variables displayed in 
figure 4.5.1 is indeed much closer than in the short-run. This clearly holds for the relationship 
between internal and external relative prices as well (see figure 4.6.2). 
Figure 4.6.2: Annual mean growth rate of the external relative price of GDP and the internal relative 
price of services to goods, as compared to the EU15 (1999-2016) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data  
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4.2. Aspects and indicators of economic convergence within the EU 
Economic convergence has several aspects and meanings; therefore, a number of indicators are 
necessary to determine the existence/extent of convergence within a group of countries, such as the 
member states of the EU. In the following, we address two broad aspects: real economic and price 
convergence.33 The former refers to (per capita) real GDP, while by the latter we mean both the 
general level and the pattern of relative prices. Regarding the meaning of convergence, we rely on 
two interpretations: the “catching up” of less developed countries to the more affluent ones on the 
one hand (“beta-convergence”), and the fall in dispersion within the group (“sigma-convergence”).34 
To motivate the relevance of applying alternative indicators of convergence, we depart from the 
decomposition of relative changes in per capita GDP levels measured at PPP as compared to the 
EU15. We continue by discussing real economic and price convergence based on alternative 
concepts. 
4.2.1. Decomposition of changes in comparative per capita GDP levels measured at PPP 
As discussed in section 3, the relevant indicator for comparing per capita real incomes across 
countries in a particular year is per capita GDP measured at current PPP. The comparative form of 
this indicator (e.g., relative to the EU-average), however, is often applied for making comparisons 
over time as well. Such comparisons are intended to express changes in the overall performance of 
countries in two respects at the same time: both relative to their earlier position and to other 
countries involved in the comparison.  
The possible pitfalls in these types of international comparisons can be gauged by the decomposition 
of the annual average growth rate of per capita GDP measured at current PPP relative to the EU15 
into thee components (see figure 4.7.1). 
Annual relative growth rate of per capita GDP at current PPP = 
- relative GDP growth at constant prices, minus  
- relative population growth (for easier visual inspection, relative growth carries a negative, 
while a relative decline carries a positive sign), plus 
- effects due to changes in composition, relative prices and methodological revisions in 
calculating PPPs.35 
                                                          
33
 Issues related to real convergence within the euro area have recently been addressed by ECB (2015) and Diaz 
del Hoyo et al. (2017). Specific issues related to the real convergence of central-eastern and southern Europe 
are discussed in Żuk et al. (2018). 
34
 The first is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the second to hold; see e.g., Sala-i Martin (1996) 
35
 This component is a residual, corresponding to the difference between relative per capita growth rate 
measured at current PPP and relative per capita growth rate measured at constant prices.   
34 
 
Figure 4.7.1: Contributions to annual per capita GDP growth measured at current PPP, relative to the 
EU15 in 27 EU-countries between 1995 and 2016 
 
Notation: VLCgdp_PPP: per capita GDP relative to the EU15 at current PPP 
IE*: regarding Ireland, the average for 1995-2014 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data  
The countries are ranked in ascending order of relative per capita GDP growth measured at current 
PPP. The figure reveals that this indicator (and thus, the ranking of countries) is heavily affected by 
factors other than comparative GDP growth at constant prices (the latter is indicated by blue bars on 
the chart). The most striking example is that of Ireland, whose real GDP growth (even disregarding 
the extraordinary years of 2015 and 2016) was by far the highest within the EU, still, its position is 
between Hungary and Croatia, countries with significantly lower real GDP growth. The reason is that 
while composition effects and population change “pushed up” PPP-based per capita growth in the 
latter two countries, both of these factors had the opposite sign in Ireland. It is also worth noting that 
the countries with the highest per capita GDP growth rates measured at PPP are the ones having 
experienced the largest relative decline in population size.  
Since the relative fall in population cannot be considered as an indication of better macroeconomic 
performance and, furthermore, the actual content of “composition and relative price effects plus the 
impact of methodological changes” is very far from being unambiguous, indicators of changes in 
comparative performances based on GDP growth measured at constant prices have also to be taken 
into consideration.36  
Figure 4.7.2 develops this point by displaying the relationship between changes in relative real GDP 
and per capita GDP at PPP (left-hand side) and the relationship between the latter variable and 
“other factors” (right-hand side).  
                                                          
36
 In the following we shall rely on indicators of GDP per unit of labour input (labour productivity) as well; the 
concerns regarding the interpretation of population change are not relevant for these indicators. 
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Figure 4.7.2: The relationship between relative change in real per capita incomes at PPP and GDP 
growth (left pane) and other factors (right pane) – average annual changes between 1995 and 2016 
 
*IE: for Ireland, average growth rates between 1995 and 2014 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data  
The left pane shows that per capita relative GDP growth at PPP exceeded the relative growth of GDP 
at constant prices in most of the countries at the higher end of the horizontal scale. The right pane, in 
turn, indicates that that there is a correspondence between relative GDP growth at PPP and “other 
factors” (than relative real GDP growth proper). These “other factors” include relative population 
change, as well as changes in composition (etc.), which, as emphasized above, are dubious reflections 
of superior performance of a catching-up country. The message of figure 4.7.2 is straightforward: it is 
insufficient, and it may be misleading to address only convergence measured by comparative per 
capita GDP at current PPPs. Relative real GDP growth rates are also relevant for comparing the 
economic performance of countries. 
4.2.2. Sigma convergence  
Figure 4.8 shows the evolution of the dispersion of three key variables across EU-member states: per 
capita GDP at PPP, the relative price level of GDP and the internal relative price of services to goods. 
Dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation (CV; the standard deviation divided by the 
unweighted mean of the respective variables), which is an indication of so-called sigma 
convergence.37. 
Figure 4.8: coefficients of variation (CVs) of per capita GDP at PPP(VLC15_GDP), the price level of GDP 
(PL15_GDP) and the internal relative price of services to goods(RP_S_G) in the EU27 (1995-2016) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
                                                          
37
 The extent of dispersion can alternatively by expressed by the standard deviation (SD) of the logs of the 
respective indicators (the sign of SD is , sigma). 
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The chart presents clear evidence of sigma convergence regarding all of the three indicators until the 
international economic and financial crisis in 2008-2009. The fall in the dispersion of relative external 
prices (red line) began earlier and went further than that in relative real income levels (blue line). 
Indeed, the chart indicates that during the period reviewed the tendency of sigma convergence with 
respect to real incomes started only in the early 2000s, but it was rather even and rapid until 2008. 
The dispersion in internal relative prices, departing from a lower initial extent of dispersion (green 
line) also decreased until the crisis. 
Developments after 2008-2009 are different with respect to relative real incomes and relative prices. 
Regarding real incomes, the fall in dispersion continued, albeit at a slower pace than before the crisis. 
By contrast, the dispersion in external relative prices increased, while that in internal relative prices, 
after a temporary increase, was more-or-less constant. The observation of time series on sigma 
convergence offers guidance for identifying breaking points in the process of economic convergence 
and, therefore, in the analysis of beta convergence.  
4.2.3. Beta convergence 
While sigma convergence concerns the dispersion of incomes, the concept of beta convergence 
relates to “catching up”. A group of countries is considered to be characterised by beta convergence 
if countries with initially lower relative real income tend to grow more rapidly than the more affluent 
ones. A straightforward way of testing the existence of this type of convergence is to regress the 
growth rate of real income on the “initial” relative level of income. If the coefficient of the “initial” 
level turns out to be significantly negative, the result can be considered as an indication of absolute 
(or, unconditional) beta-convergence.38 In the following we test whether or not the EU27 was 
characterised by unconditional convergence over the period 1995-2016. Visual observation suggests 
that it was (see figure 4.9). 
Figure 4.9:The relationship between per capita GDP growth rate between 1995 and 2016 at constant 
prices and log per capita GDP in 1995 at PPP: 27 EU-countries 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
 
Figure 4.9 indicates a negative relationship between the growth rate of per capita GDP at constant 
prices over the period 1995 – 2016 and the log of the level of per capita GDP (in PPP units) in 1995. 
However, as shown by figure 4.8 earlier, there may have been a change in the convergence process 
                                                          
38
 In case of conditional convergence, the existence of convergence can be demonstrated only by adding 
control variables (institutions, government policy etc.) expressing differences other than “initial” real income in 
the growth equation. See e.g. Barro – Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
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after 2008. Therefore, we will compare the results for the sub-period 1995-2008 with those for the 
period as a whole. 
Given the sizable differences in individual countries between the comparative growth rate of per 
capita GDP measured at PPP on the one hand, and the comparative growth rate of GDP at constant 
prices on the other (see figure 4.7.1), we consider three alternative indicators of real economic 
convergence: 
- annual average growth rate of per capita GDP at constant prices;  
- annual average growth rate of GDP at constant prices; 
- annual average comparative growth rate of per capita GDP measured at PPP, relative to the 
EU15. 
The equations to be estimated, corresponding to the first two indicators have the following form:  
 
1
𝑇
𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑄𝑌𝑖,𝑇
𝑄𝑌𝑖,0
= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2log(𝑌𝑖,0) + 𝜀𝑖 (4.1) 
where Y(i,0) indicates the level of per capita GDP of country i, measured at PPP in the base period 
(denoted as 0); T denotes the number of years observed, while log[QY(i, T)/QY(I, 0)] indicates the 
growth of either per capita GDP or that of GDP, measured at constant prices over the period 
observed. 
Equation (4.1) corresponds to the standard form of growth equations: the rate of real economic 
growth is regressed on the log of initial real income. However, the meaning of “real” is different on 
the two sides of the eqation. On the LHS “real” is a shorthand for growth at constant prices (either of 
GDP, or per capita GDP), while on the RHS “real” means levels expressed in current PPP units. 
Since variables expessed in current PPP units are designed for cross-secton real (volume) 
comparisons, their dynamics, by themselves, would not make more sense than the dynamics of any 
variable expressed at current prices. Neither of the two reflect real dynamics in the sense of changes 
in volumes. 
A way of handling the issue is to express both sides of the equation in PPP units relative to a 
reference region, which is the EU15 in our case (this corresponds to the third indicator above).  
 
1
𝑇
𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑌𝑖,𝑇 𝑌𝐸𝑈,𝑇⁄
𝑌𝑖,0 𝑌𝐸𝑈,0⁄
= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2log (
𝑌𝑖,0
𝑌𝐸𝑈,0
) + 𝜀𝑖   (4.2) 
where Y denotes per capita GDP at current PPP and the index (EU) refers to EU15 average. 
The idea behind equation (4.2) is that since “real” relative positions are involved in each consecutive 
year, the time series of these relative positions may be interpreted as special kind of real series 
(however, as already discussed in the foregoing, they are affected by changes in composition etc.).  
It is important to note that equations (4.1) and (4.2) are log-linear transformations of the relationship 
connecting growth rates with initial income, therefore, the coefficient of initial income (α2) has also 
to be transformed in order to obtain the speed of convergence (denoted by ), reflecting the 
estimated pace of closing the initial income gap.  is calculated as 39 
                                                          
39
The actual form of the equation is: 
1
𝑇
∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌𝑖,𝑇
𝑌𝑖,0
) =  𝛼 −
[1−𝑒−𝛽𝑇)
𝑇
∗ log (𝑌𝑖,0) + . This formula can be 
derived from Barro – Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 37. 
38 
 
𝛽 = −log (1 + 𝑇 ∗ 𝛼2)/𝑇 
where α2 denotes the coefficient of initial income in the log-linear regression.The ratio of beta to 
Ln(2), in turn, provides an indication of “half-life convergence”, i.e, the number of years necessary to 
close the half of the income gap (assuming a contant speed of convergence)40 
Half-life = ln(2)/ 
The estimates for the coefficient α2, as well as the impied values for  and half life convegence, are 
summarised in table 4.1. The first three columns refer to the whole preiod (1995-2016), the second 
three to 1995-2008 (the pre-crisis years), while last three ones to 2008-2016. In columns 1, 4 and 7 
the explanatory variable is the log of per capita GDP measured at PPP relative to the EU15 in 1995. 
The explanatory variable in all other columns is simply the log of per capita GDP measured in PPP in 
1995. The dependent variables in columns 1, 4 and 7 are annual growth rates of per capita GDP in 
PPP relative to the EU15; in columns 2, 5 and 8: per capita GDP annual growth rates at constant 
prices; in columns 3, 6 and 9: GDP annual growth rates at constant prices.  
Table 4.1: The coefficient of log per capita income in 1995 and 2008, the speed of convergence and 
half-life convergence based on three indicators of economic growth between 1996 and 2016 and in 
two sub-periods 
 
Note: in columns 1, 4 and 7 the explanatory variable is the log of per capita GDP at current PPP relative to the 
EU15 in the first year of the respective periods and the growth rate of per capita GDP at PPP relative to the 
EU15 is the dependent variable. In other columns the log of per capita GDP at current PPP in the first year of 
the respective periods is the explanatory variable and the dependent variable is the one indicated in the 
heading of the respective columns. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
The results displayed in table 4.1 indicate that the EU27 was characterised by absolute beta 
convergence in the period as a whole according to all of the three indicators considered (rows 1-3). 
However, in the first sub-period convergence was much steeper than in the second one (which 
includes the international crisis of 2009 and its aftermath). Convergence in terms of GDP-growth 
actually halted after 2008 (see column 9). 41 
                                                          
40
 Convergence is governed by the term:  𝑒−𝛽𝑇, which is equal to ½, if T = ln(2)/. 
41
 Our detailed results, including the ones related to convergence in productivity and those based on panel 
regressions are presented in Appendix A. The results of the regressions based on panel data, including lagged 
value of the relative development variable as an explanatory variable, are similar to those presented in table 
4.1. The results for productivity relative to the EU15 are almost the same as for per capita income. All 
specifications suggest that real economic convergence measured by per capita GDP significantly slowed down 
1995-2016 1995-2008 2008-2016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Per capita 
GDP, 
current 
PPP 
(EU15=1)
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices
 GDP, 
constant 
prices
Per capita 
GDP, 
current 
PPP 
(EU15=1)
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices
 GDP, 
constant 
prices
Per capita 
GDP, 
current 
PPP 
(EU15=1)
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices
 GDP, 
constant 
prices
α2 -0.0252*** -0,0225*** -0.0125***-0.0311*** -0,0289*** -0.0185***-0.0245*** -0.0194** -0.0052
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0082)
R2 0.787 0.705 0.379 0.796 0.739 0.487 0.275 0.222 0.016
No. obs. 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
 3.6% 3.0% 1.4% 4,0% 3.6% 2.1% 2.7% 2.1%
Half life [ln(2)/] 19 23 48 17 19 33 25 33
Dependent variable: annual growth rate of 
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Irrespective of the period observed, there appears to be a hierarchy among the indicators. Relative 
per capita incomes at current PPP tend to converge more rapidly than per capita incomes measured 
at constant prices. Considering real GDP-growth by itself (disregarding the effect of changes in 
population size) the pace of convergence turns out to be the slowest, or (in the second sub-period) 
inexistent. 
By comparing the -s belonging to the different dependent variables, we can get an idea of the 
importance of two factors having contributed to the speed of convergence measured by comparative 
per capita GDP growth at PPP (see columns 1, 4 and 7). The difference between the betas in columns 
1 and 2, 4 and 5, as well as 6 and 7, show the importance of factors related to changes in 
composition, relative prices and methodology. In the period as a whole and in in the two sub-periods 
these factors contributed by 0.6, 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively, to the speed of 
convergence measured at PPP, which was 3.6, 4.0% and 2.7% during the periods reviewed. As 
already discussed in section 3, the actual content of these factors is rather vague; their net effect 
may, or may not, reflect an improvement in overall real economic performance, especially over 
shorter periods. However, as attested by the results presented in table 4.1, real economic 
convergence measured by the relative growth in per capita GDP at constant prices (columns 2, 5 and 
8) has been augmented by the net effect of these unidentified factors – at least in the EU and over 
the period in our focus. 
The meaning of the difference between the -s in columns 3 and 2 (and between 5 and 6, as well as 8 
and 9), in turn, is plainly identifiable: it reflects the impact of population-change on the speed of 
convergence measured by per capita GDP at constant prices. The relative change in the size of 
population had a profound effect on this standard indicator of real economic convergence among 
EU-countries during the period observed: over the whole period, and until 2008, it contributed to the 
speed of convergence of per capita GDP measured at constant prices (3.0% and 3.6%) by 1.6 and 1.5 
percentage points, respectively. (This effect cannot be identified for the second sub-period, since 
there was no statistically significant convergence in terms of GDP growth between 2009 and 2016.) 
This implies that a considerable part of convergence in per capita GDP at constant prices was related 
– in technical terms at least – to the relative population decline in the initially poorer (converging) 
and the relative population increase in the initially wealthier economies.  
Moreover, as shown by figure 4.10, among the nine initially least developed economies, seven 
experienced not simply a relative fall in population (as compared to the EU15 average), but also an 
absolute decline, while in two of them there was practically no change. By contrast, all of the initially 
more developed economies experienced at least some (often significant) increases. Therefore, the 
finding that the growth in per capita real GDP is negatively associated with “initial” real income in the 
EU, has to be considered in view of the fact that the change in population is positively related to 
initial income. A process of convergence in per capita GDP levels that relies (to repeat, in technical 
terms) on continuous population-decline in the rapidly converging economies is very unlikely to be 
sustainable in the longer run. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in the period 2009-2016; they also suggest that there was no real convergence in this period based on the 
change in real GDP.  
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Figure 4.10: Annual average change in real GDP and population size as a function of log per capita 
income in 1995 at PPP in the EU 27 between 1996 and 2016  
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
Returning to table 4.1, the results can be interpreted intuitively by observing the last row, indicating 
the number of years necessary for closing the half of the initial income gap, assuming a constant 
speed of convergence (). Regarding the whole period (1995-2016), and, counterfactually, assuming 
the continuation of the general trend observed in this period, for the EU27 it would take 19 years to 
reach half-life convergence in per capita GDP measured at PPP relative to the EU15 average. 23 years 
would be necessary to close the half of the income gap, if only volume changes in per capita GDP 
were to move the process of real economic convergence. The shocking finding is that more than the 
double, about 48 years would be needed for half-life convergence, if only real GDP-growth (at 
unchanged population size) were to drive real convergence within the EU. Given these differences, 
we shall apply all of the three indicators in our further quantitative analysis.  
Relying on the PWT (2017), in Box 4.2 we observe patterns characterising real economic convergence 
between 1995 and 2014 on a sample of 144 (119) countries inclusive (exclusive) of 25 EU countries42, 
as well as the EU25. As it turns out, for the sample of 119 countries beta convergence in terms of 
GDP-growth is steeper than in terms of per capita GDP growth, confirming the finding that the 
pattern characterising convergence in countries other than EU-member states is the opposite to the 
one typifying the EU during the period observed.  
Box 4.2: Comparisons based on the PWT 9.0 – the relationship between convergence in terms of per 
capita GDP and GDP growth (1995-2014) 
The left panel of the figure below shows the growth rate of real per capita GDP and that of GDP 
between 1996 and 2014 as a function of log per capita GDP at current PPP in the year 1995, for a 
sample of 119 countries at low, medium and high level of economic development, but excluding EU-
member states. The right pane shows the same for the EU25.  
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 To remind: Cyprus and Malta are not included in our sample. 
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Figure B4.2.1: Real economic convergence in terms of per capita GDP and GDP between 1996 and 
2014 in 119 countries excluding the EU25 (LHS) and in the EU25 (RHS) 
 
Notations: d_rgdpna_pop, d_rgdpna, respectively: the annual growth rate of per capita real GDP and real GDP; 
cgdpo_pop95: per capita GDP at current PPP in 1995. 
Source: own calculations based on PWT (2017) 
The overall pattern displayed by the sample of 119 countries is quite different from the one 
characterising the EU25. Regarding the large sample (LHS), the regression line for GDP is steeper than 
for per capita GDP, while the opposite holds for the EU25 (RHS). As shown by figure B4.2.2, this is 
due to the fact that for the countries included in the larger sample, the association between “initial” 
income and population growth is negative, while it is positive in the case of the EU25. In both cases 
the coefficients are significant at 1 percent (see table B4.2.1). 
Figure B4.2.2: The relationship between the growth rate of the population and per capita GDP at 
current PPP in 1995 in the period 1996-2014 
 
Source: own calculations based on PWT (2017) 
Table B4.2.1 summarises the result of the nine regressions including the three variables discussed 
above on the level of income in 1995 for the whole sample, the sample excluding the EU25 and the 
EU25. 
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Table B4.2.1: Regression results for the period 1995-2014: the coefficients of per capita income in 
1995 at current PPP; dependent variables: the growth rate of (i) per capita GDP (ii) GDP (iii) 
population size 
 
Notations: d_rgdpna_pop, d_rgdpna and d_pop, respectively, denote annual growth rate of per capita GDP, 
GDP and population. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
Source: own calculations based on PWT (2017).  
While the relationship between convergence in terms of per capita income and GDP growth in the EU 
was the opposite of the one displayed by the broad sample, the coefficients of initial income are 
much higher (so are the R2-s) for the EU in both respects, indicating that real economic convergence, 
however interpreted, has been significantly steeper within the EU than in the larger sample of 
countries.43  
Finally, we present the results regarding beta convergence in GDP price levels and in relative prices 
of services to goods within the EU. Beside the period 1995-2016, we also observe developments over 
1999-2016, since the data on internal relative prices of new member states is available beginning 
1999.  
Table 4.2.: Estimation results: convergence in price levels and internal relative prices  
 
Note: the explanatory variable in columns 1-5 is the relative price level of GDP (PL15_gdp) in the first year in 
the heading of the column. In columns 6-8 the explanatory variable is the internal relative price of services to 
goods (RP_s_g) in the first year in the heading of the column. 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
The results of the estimations suggest that convergence in terms of price levels was more rapid than 
in internal relative prices over the comparable periods in which convergence could actually be 
observed. However, the catching up in both price levels and relative prices came to a halt after 2009, 
similarly to convergence in real GDP.  
                                                          
43
 It is worth noting that the results for the broad sample are influenced by the inclusion of a few countries 
having displayed extreme growth rates. By disregarding these cases, the coefficient of convergence in terms of 
per capita GDP becomes very low and statistically insignificant. 
Explanatory variable: the log of per capita income at current PPP in 1995 [ln(cgdpo_pop95)]
Dependent variable
d_rgdpna_pop -0.0046*** -0.0045*** -0,0238***
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0037)
d_rgdpna -0.0093*** -0.0077*** -0.0135***
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0041)
d_pop -0.0044*** -0.0029*** 0.010***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0014)
R2 0.074 0.280 0.173 0.058 0.177 0.078 0.641 0.323 0.695
Observations 144 144 144 119 119 119 25 25 25
Total Total less EU25 EU25
1995-2016 1999-2016 1995-2008 1999-2008 2008-2016 1999-2016 1999-2008 2008-2016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable:
α2 -0.0226*** -0.0210*** -0.0402*** -0.0466*** 0.0080 -0.0150*** -0.0322*** 0.0029
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0062) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0051)
R2 0.87 0.82 0.91 0.88 0.06 0.60 0.66 0.01
No. obs. 26 26 26 26 26 25 25 25
 3.1% 2.6% 5.7% 6.0% 1.7% 3.8%
Half life [ln(2)/] 23 27 12 11 40 18
Annual growth of PL15_GDP Annual growth of RP_s_g
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5. Interpreting and measuring real exchange rate misalignment 
In the present section we investigate the relationship between different concepts of the real 
exchange rate (RER) and the level of economic development, in order to calculate alternative 
measures of RER-misalignment. As discussed in section 3, we rely on two concepts of the RER: the 
external price level of GDP and the internal relative price of services to goods. With respect to the 
level of development, we apply two indicators: real income (per capita GDP at PPP) and real 
productivity (GDP per persons employed at PPP). We interpret RER-misalignment as the deviation of 
an actual RER from the level consistent with the relative real income/productivity of a country. The 
real implications of misalignments (i.e., for economic growth and convergence) are addressed in 
section 6.  
Similarly to most approaches in the literature, reviewed in section 5.1., the real effects of 
misalignments are estimated in a two-step procedure. The first step includes the estimation of 
income- (productivity-) consistent RERs, as well as corresponding measures of RER-misalignment. In 
the second stage (in section 6), we estimate the effect of alternative measures of misalignment by 
means of growth-regressions, controlling for other potential determinants of growth.  
5.1. The equilibrium real exchange rate, RER-misalignment and its relationship with economic 
growth: an overview of the literature  
Our approach is related to the extensive literature that addresses two interrelated questions. The 
first aims to identify the long-term determinants of RERs and estimate the level of the RER consistent 
with fundamental economic variables. The second question addresses the consequences of 
deviations from this level, i.e., the effects of “overvalued”/”undervalued” real exchange rates.  
A part of the related literature is referred to as one on the „equilibrium real exchange rate” (ERER), 
though this expression is often criticized by the argument that the observed real exchange rate is 
always a (short term) equilibrium outcome – this criticism, however, neglects the possibility of 
bubbles. The numerous methods differ in the horizon of the equilibrium (short-term, medium-term, 
long-term) and the underlying model that the estimation is based upon. Box 5.1 presents an 
overview of alternative approaches to ERER. 
Box 5.1: Approaches to the concept of the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) 
The starting point of most approaches is the absolute version of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
theory of exchange rates (Cassel 1922), stating that the ERER corresponds to the ratio of the 
purchasing power of currencies. This theory is mistakenly believed to be grounded on the 
assumption of the “law of one price” (LOP), which states that international goods-arbitrage ensures 
that the price level between two countries should be the same expressed in a common currency. This 
interpretation of the PPP theory, however, rests on a misunderstanding. What Cassel actually had in 
mind was a long-term equilibrium relationship, rather than an identity (i.e., the LOP, implied by 
commodity-arbitrage), which, disregarding transaction costs, holds at any exchange rate (Samuelson, 
1964). The absolute version of the PPP theory tends to hold among countries at similar levels of 
development, but – as discussed by Harrod (1936) and Samuelson (1964), and, as demonstrated by 
Balassa (1964) – it never holds among countries at different levels of real income. Therefore, it is 
seldom used to assess the level of the RER – at least not in its raw, unadjusted form.  
The methods for estimating RERs most closely related to the concept of equilibrium are the 
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) (Williamson, 2008) and the Desired Equilibrium 
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Exchange Rate (DEER) (Bayoumi et al, 2004) which define the ERER as a RER consistent with the 
internal and external balance of the economy in the medium run. Similarly, the The Natural Real 
Exchange Rate (NATREX) (Stein, 1994 and 2002) looks for a long term, flexible price ERER in a 
structural general equilibrium framework. The Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) and the 
Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER) (Clark and Mcdonald 1999; McDonald 2007) rather can 
be considered as short term ERER concepts based on the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relationship 
and relying on reduced form estimations, in which the RER is regressed on a set of fundamentals. For 
a thorough survey of the different methods see e.g., Égert (2004) and Driver and Westaway (2003).  
Our approach fits into the strand of literature that relates the real exchange rate to the level of 
economic development (measured by relative real income and/or relative productivity). As discussed 
in section 2, one of the most robust results in the literature on RER is the close and positive 
relationship between economic development and RERs. The relationship can be explained by 
alternative models and is confirmed on different sample periods and set of countries. This approach 
is often referred to as the PPP adjusted for the “Penn-effect”. The exchange rate consistent with the 
level of development can be identified by using the general relationship between the two variables 
estimated on a set of countries (in our case the EU), and the misalignment of the real exchange rate 
is interpreted as a deviation from the development-consistent value.  
Numerous studies have examined this relationship. Although there are differences in many aspects 
among the empirical estimations, the conclusions are quite similar. Majority of the results suggest 
that an overvalued RER involves lower GDP growth, while an undervalued RER enhances it, however, 
many papers find asymmetric effects, or only for very large deviations. The magnitude and relevance 
of this empirical finding, however, heavily relies on the econometric method applied, the sample of 
countries, the time period and other underlying economic conditions and assumptions. 
First of all, what strongly influences the results is the calculation of the RER misalignment. It was 
Balassa (1964) who first adjusted the RER using its positive relationship with the level of GDP. He 
defined misalignment as the deviation of the RER from its value predicted by the level of income. We 
use a similar framework for our estimations. As a consequence of this method, the misalignment 
depends on the assumed functional form between RER and GDP per capita. Balassa (1964) used a 
simple linear functional form, but there were studies using log-log form (see for example Rogoff, 
1996 or Rodrik, 2008), quadratic form (see for example Dollar, 1992 or Easterly, 2001) while Bhalla 
(2012) estimated an “S-shaped” exponential model.  
The results are also sensitive to the chosen econometric method (see table 5.1). Some authors 
estimated the misalignment using cross-sectional data for each year (see for example Johnson, Ostry 
and Subramanian, 2007), while others applied advanced panel techniques (see for example Prasad, 
Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Rodrik, 2008; or MacDonald and Vieira, 2010). The conceptual 
difference between cross-sectional and panel estimations is whether one believes that the GDP per 
capita and its price level have a time-invariant stable relationship or it may change over time. An in-
between method is the use of five-year averages (as in Rodrik, 2008).  
In addition, there are authors who disagree that the “equilibrium RER” is only the function of the 
level of development; they suggest the inclusion of other variables in the RER equation for the 
estimation of its misalignment. For example Aguirre and Calderon (2005) controlled for differences in 
terms of trade index, labour productivity and government spending in their equilibrium RER 
equation. Depending on the included control variables, the estimation technique and the underlying 
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assumptions and simplifications, many different concepts have been established for the equilibrium 
RER estimation (for more details on this point, see Isard, 2007 and Berg and Miao, 2010). 
Table 5.1 summarises the results of the studies reviewed in the foregoing and includes the results of 
some others as well. It shows the method applied, the sample chosen and the findings of the authors 
with respect to the estimated RER, as well as the estimated effect of misalignment. The works 
included in the table aim to clarify and compare (i) the estimated long-term relationship between 
different concepts of the RER and economic fundamentals, most importantly, the level of economic 
development; (ii) the effect of misalignment of the real exchange rate from its development-
consistent value on growth, or both.  
As mentioned, methods of the estimation include simple cross section estimations for a single year 
or an average of a period, panel estimations with or without fixed effect, and there are a few papers 
that apply vector models such as VECM. All papers find a significantly positive relationship with high 
explanatory power, however, the long term parameter of the variable of relative development (per 
capita GDP measured at PPP or labour productivity) varies across the estimations.  
The effect of misaligned real exchange rate is usually measured by adding in some form the 
estimated misalignment to the growth regression in addition to the usual variables affecting growth. 
Most approaches add the contemporary value of the misalignment. Most of the papers find that 
overvalued real exchange rates hamper growth contemporaneously, but there are exceptions. For 
example, Esterly et al (2005) find that if extreme values are excluded from the sample, overvaluation 
does not have detrimental effects. Bereaux et al (2012) also find that the effect is non-linear, larger 
misalignments have disproportionally larger effect. Most papers find that the direction of the 
deviation from equilibrium also matters and the effect is “symmetric”, that is, overvaluation is 
harmful and undervaluation is beneficial for growth.44  
One of the most comprehensive works about this effect is by Bhalla (2012). He carried out the 
estimations on a sample of 130 countries between 1950 and 2011. His results clearly support the 
hypothesis that misalignment has a significant negative effect on real economic growth, which means 
that undervaluation boosts GDP per capita growth, while overvaluation impedes it. This effect 
proved to be very robust in his estimations, regardless of the chosen econometric method or the 
sample selection. 
Rodrik (2008) and MacDonald – Vieira (2010) also used a large sample of countries for the estimation 
and arrived at similar results as Bhalla (2012), who, in addition, examined whether the effect varies 
across countries at different levels of development. He found that the negative relationship between 
misalignment and growth is much stronger for less developed countries than for more affluent ones. 
Similarly, Rodrik also finds that (2008) the growth boosting effect of undervaluation is significant only 
in develpint countries.  
Although Rodrik’s (2008) and Bhalla’s (2012) large sample estimations clearly support the growth-
boosting effect of undervaluation, it is not evident whether this relationship can be used for policy 
formation as well. To answer this question one needs to know the proper mechanism how RER 
misalignment affects GDP growth. Rodrik (2008) outlined a possible channel that may be responsible 
for this effect. He argued that bad institutions and market failures have a much stronger impact on 
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 Throughout our study, similarly to Berg and Miao (2010), we use the notion of “symmetric effect” of 
misalignments in the above sense, though we are aware that “symmetry” is sometimes considered to imply 
that both under- and overvaluations are harmful for growth. This, however, would involve an asymmetry in the 
sense that misalignments with a negative and a positive sign would both have a negative effect on growth. 
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the tradable sector than on nontradables. Since in developing countries these problems are probably 
more serious, suboptimal amount of resources will be used in the tradable sector. RER 
undervaluation makes the production of tradables more profitable, thus it pushes the economy 
closer to the optimal level of production. He empirically tested this hypothesis and found that the 
effect of RER misalignment on growth proved to be larger for economies with bad institutions. 
Berg and Miao (2010) examined this issue by comparing the Penn-effect adjusted (i.e., Rodrik’s) 
concept of misalignment with the one implied by the FEER. The latter suggests that both under- and 
overvaluations are harmful for growth, but the authors, similarly to Rodrik, clearly show that 
overvaluation harms, while undervaluation supports growth. The problem raised by the authors is 
actually related to identification: the same factors that contribute to growth, may also contribute to 
RER-changes and their misalignments.  
Table 5.1: Alternative estimates of RER-misalignments and their effects   
  The level of RER consistent with the 
level of developmen 
Effect of misalignment 
author sample  method results  method  results  
Kravis and Lipsey 
(1983) 
34 developed and 
developing 
countries 
cross sectional 
regressions 
high elasticity 
(0,6-0,9) for price 
level, somewhat 
lower (0,5-0,6) for 
relative price 
-  
Fischer (2007) Euro area 
panel, fixed 
effect, single 
equation 
elasticity of 0.5-
0.6 for a one 
percent shock to 
relative 
productivity on 
relative price 
levels 
- - 
Galstyan and Lane 
(2009) 
1980-1004, OECD 
countries 
Panel DOLS, 
country and time 
fixed effects, 
single equation 
high elasticity, 
0.75-1.1, gov. 
consumption 
increases, gov 
investment. 
decreases RER 
- - 
Anderson et 
al(2009) 
Euro area 
countries 
VECM High elasticity, 
close to 1 is most 
countries 
  
Aguirre and 
Calderon(2005) 
 Panel DOLS, 
country and time 
fixed effects, 
single eq 
High elasticity Panel S 
system GMM  
undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth 
Rodrik(2008) 1950-2004, 
developed and 
developing 
 
Panel, time effect elasticity of 0.24 
 
panel, 5 year 
averages, time 
and co fixed 
effect 
undervaluation accelerates 
growth but only in developing 
countries 
 
MacDonald and 
Vierra(2010) 
1980-2004, 90 
developed and 
developing 
country 
Panel, fixed and 
random effect 
 Panel, GMM  undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth, effect is stronger for 
developing and emerging 
countries 
Bereau et al 
(2012)  
 
1980-2007, 
advanced and 
developing 
countries (cca 25) 
Panel fixed effect, 
pooled mean 
group estimator 
 
variables are 
cointregrated, all 
the three 
variables are 
significant 
Nonlinear panel 
 
undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth, effect increases with 
the size  
 
Bhalla(2012) 130 countries, 
1950-2011 
Multiple   Multiple undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth, result is robust to 
specification and the method 
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Mbaye (2012) 72 countries, 
1970-2008 
Multiple  low elasticity, 
0.16 
Multiple undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth through the TFP 
channel 
Razmi et al (2011) 153 countries, 
1960-2004 
Multiple elasticity of 0.24 Multiple undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth through the investment 
channel 
Habib et al (2016) 150 countries, 
1970-2010 
Panel elasticity of 0.24-
0.27 
Panel, based on 
IV  
undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth in developing 
countries, the effect is stronger 
with pegged ER 
Berg and Miao 
(2010) 
181 countries 
1950-2004 
Multiple elasticity of 0.23 Multiple undervaluation accelerates, 
overvaluation decelerates 
growth 
 
5.2. Estimation of misalignment  
5.2.1. Methodology and results 
Our approach basically follows the method based on PPP adjusted for the relative level of 
development, but similarly to e.g., Aguirre and Calderon (2005), Galstyan and Lane (2009) and 
others, and we also consider other fundamental control variables that relates our method to the 
BEER approach.  
The majority of unit root tests showed that the relative level of development and the real exchange 
rate variables are integrated, and the Johansssen cointegration test and other tests showed that 1 
cointegrating relationship exists between both the per capita relative GDP (VLCgdp) and the external 
price level (PLgdp), and per capita GDP and the internal relative price (RP_sg).  
We use single equation panel cointegration regressions to estimate the long term relationship 
between the variables. 45  
We estimate the long term relationship between the level of development and real exchange rate 
indicators using panel data for the period 1995-2016 for 27 EU countries.46 The literature is 
ambivalent with respect to using fixed effects in the panel estimation, as the choice between adding 
or omitting fixed country effects can be characterized by a trade-off. On one hand, by applying fixed 
country constants, one practically loses the cross-country variation of RERs, and the long term 
relationship is identified only from within changes. Therefore, the fixed effects imply that the 
misalignment is zero in all countries in the average of the period and rules out the possibility of 
permament misalignment. Taking into account that our sample covers only 20 years, this is a very 
strong assumption. On the other hand, without fixed country effect, the estimated misalignment 
might also contain long term country specific factors that arise e.g. from compositional or 
methodological differences or related to other unobserved characteristics and not from mispricing. 
Taking into account that the zero misalignment assumption seems to be quite restrictive and not 
realistic in our short sample, while between-country variation explains the bulk of the total variation 
in our RER and development-level variables, our baseline model, similarly to e.g. Rodrik (2008), does 
                                                          
45 We also tried the VECM method, though – perhaps due to the relatively small sample – the estimations differ 
significantly from the single-equation results and are extremely sensitive to the number of lags in the model, so 
we decided not to apply VECM.  
46
 For reasons discussed earlier, Luxembourg is not included in our sample. 
48 
 
not include country specific constants. However, as a robustness check, we also present fixed effect 
estimations (see Appendix D). 
The long term relationships are calculated with the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) method, as this method 
accounts for the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residual, as well as endogeneity by 
adding the leads and lags of the differenced independent variable to the regression. All coefficients 
are presented with robust standard errors.  
The DOLS specification with fixed time effects is the following: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿) + Γ𝑿𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗Δlog (𝑿𝑡+𝑗,𝑖)
1
𝑗=−1
∑ 𝜃𝑗 ∆log (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡+𝑗,𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿 )
1
𝑗=−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖 stands for three different measures of the real exchange rate of country i in year t, namely: (i) 
the external relative price level of GDP measured at current PPP (𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖); (ii) the internal relative 
price of services to goods (𝑅𝑃𝑠𝑔𝑡𝑖); (iii) the external relative price level of GDP measured at constant 
PPP of the year 2010 (𝑄𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖). All relative prices are compared to the average of the EU15.  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿, in turn, denotes three different measures of the level of economic development of country 
i in year t, relative to the to the EU15 average: (i) per capita GDP at current PPP (𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖); (ii) GDP 
per persons employed, at current PPP ( 𝑉𝐿𝑊𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖); (iii) per capita GDP at constant PPP of the year 
2010 (𝑄𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖). 
Misalignment is measured as the deviation of the actual RER from its long term predicted value by 
the above regression. 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖) −  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖)̂  
Where: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖) =̂ 𝛼?̂? + ?̂? log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿) + Γ̂𝑋𝑡𝑖 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑖)̂  is the level of the RER which is consistent with the level of development. We shall refer 
this level as a “neutral” RER. 
Note that in the DOLS specification, the differenced terms are not accounted for with respect to the 
long term relationship.47 The short term dynamics are analysed in section 6.  
Based on the literature, we added the following controls in the equation of the long term 
relationship: the growth impact of the terms of trade, government consumption, net international 
investment position, net external debt, openness, government debt. The role of the government 
consumption in the long term behaviour of the real exchange rate was showed by e.g. Galstyan and 
Lane (2009) and Milesi-Ferretti and Lee (2008). In our estimations, the coefficient is also significant 
economically and the magnitude similar to that of Galstyan and Lane (2009): a 1 percentage point 
increase in the ratio of government consumption to GDP is associated with 1,3-1,6 percent higher 
relative price level. However, in contrast to Galstyan and Lane (2009), the effect of the budget 
balance is much lower on the internal relative price and proved to be significant only in equations 
where productivity is the explanatory variable.  
                                                          
47
 The role of leading and lagged dynamic terms is to give an asymptoticaly efficient estimation for the long 
term parateter by eliminating the feedback in the cointegrating system. 
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The coefficient of openness can be regarded as large: if the openness of the country is higher by 10 
percentage points, the predicted external relative price level, as well as the internal relative price is 
lower by 1.5-2.5 percent.  
The mechanism is not straightforward; however, two channels may contribute to this outcome. First, 
a higher share of external trade in goods and services implies a stronger price competition with 
foreign suppliers (note that an increasing portion of services – e.g., financial, insurance, 
telecommunication etc. services have become increasingly tradable). Therefore, a higher degree of 
openness can be expected to put a lager pressure on the general level of domestic prices, and – 
other things equal – may result in a lower/higher price levels in more/less open economies. Second, 
policy-makers in more open economies are expected to be more concerned with the negative effects 
of overvaluation, and take steps earlier to avoid this outcome, than their counterparts in less open 
economies.  
In line with the usual finding in the literature, the net external debt to GDP ratio is found to be a 
significant determinant of long term real exchange rates, though the effect is rather small. The effect 
of the terms of trade proved to be insignificant in all specifications.  
Overall, the control variables do not add much to the model in terms of explanatory power. The level 
of relative economic development, alternatively measured, seems to be the major determinant of 
variations in alternatively defined RERs. However, the misalignment estimated with the regression 
extended with controls differs from the simple misalignment significantly only in the case of some 
countries (see Figures G.1 and G.2 in the Appendix). 
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Table 5.2: The long term relationship between the external price level of GDP (dependent variable) 
and indicators of the level of economic development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  controls  controls 
VARIABLES log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp 
     
log_vlc15_gdp 0.854*** 0.800***   
 (0.016) (0.016)   
log_vlw15_gdp   0.906*** 0.841*** 
   (0.021) (0.0228) 
nxdebt_gdp  -0.011**  -0.00808** 
  (0.004)  (0.00398) 
lntot_eff  -1.882  0.477 
  (1.603)  (1.697) 
open  -0.257***  -0.255*** 
  (0.025)  (0.0271) 
gov_gdp  0.016***  0.0192*** 
  (0.002)  (0.00232) 
Constant 0.612*** 0.606*** 0.380*** 0.373*** 
 (0.075) (0.069) (0.091) (0.0985) 
     
Observations 591 535 591 535 
R-squared 0.891 0.916 0.860 0.891 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notations: 
log_vlc15_gdp: the log of relative per capita GDP measured at constant PPP, EU15=100 
log_vlw15_gpd:log of relative per worker GDP measured at constant PPP, EU15=100 
log_pl15_gdp:log of price level of GDP, measured at current PPP, EU15=100 
log_r_p_sg: log of relative price of services to goods, EU15==100 
gov_gdp: government consumption/GDP 
open:openness, (import+export)/GDP 
nx_debt: net external debt  
lntot_eff: the effect of 1 terms of trade change on growth 
 
Table 5.3: The relationship between the internal relative price of services to goods and the level of 
economic development, 1995-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  controls  controls 
VARIABLES log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g 
     
log_vlc15_gdp 0.656*** 0.654***   
 (0.015) (0.019)   
log_vlw15_gdp   0.715*** 0.715*** 
   (0.023) (0.028) 
nxdebt_gdp  -0.014***  -0.010** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
lntot_eff  -1.842  0.100 
  (1.275)  (1.552) 
open  -0.317***  -0.330*** 
  (0.032)  (0.034) 
gov_gdp  0.002  0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant 1.588*** 1.669*** 1.310*** 1.307*** 
 (0.075) (0.082) (0.107) (0.122) 
     
Observations 535 496 535 496 
R-squared 0.850 0.893 0.821 0.879 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.4 shows the basic summary descriptive statistics for the four measures of RER-misalignment 
used in our growth regressions. As it can be seen, estimated misalignments vary in relatively wide 
range, and the standard deviation is sizable, 11-13%.  
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of different measures of RER misalignment 
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
mis_rp_vlc 536 -0.023 0.109 -0.321 0.282 
mis_rp_vlw 536 -0.017 0.109 -0.372 0.329 
mis_pl_vlc 589 -0.004 0.113 -0.606 0.254 
mis_pl_vlw 589 -0.002 0.127 -0.464 0.354 
mis_rp_vlc_cont 508 -0.023 0.109 -0.333 0.256 
mis_rp_vlw_cont 508 -0.016 0.111 -0.374 0.329 
mis_pl_vlc_cont 550 -0.009 0.115 -0.566 0.290 
mis_pl_vlw_cont 550 -0.009 0.129 -0.464 0.349 
Notations: mis_rp_vlc and mis_rp_vlc stands for the estimated misalignment in internal relative price, the benchmark 
variable is the relative per capita and per employed person GDP respectively. 
mis_pl_vlc and mis_pl_vlc stands for the estimated misalignment in external price level of GDP, the benchmark variable is 
the relative per capita and per employed person GDP respectively. The abbreviation _cont denoted misalginments 
estimated with control variables 
The average of misalignments close but not is not equal to zero, as the dynamic terms do not count into the neutral RER, 
hence the misalignments are not equal with the residuals of the regressions (see footnote 47). 
Figures of estimated misalignments by countries without and with controls respectively for the external price level and the 
internal relative price can be found in Appendix G.1 and G.2 
 
Finally, table 5.5 shows the results for the relationship between relative price levels and per capita GDPs 
measured at constant PPPs of 2010.  
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Table 5.5: Long term relationship between the external relative price level of GDP (dependent 
variable) and per capita relative real GDP, both measured at constant PPP of the year 2010 (1995-
2016) 
 (1) (2) 
  DOLS 
 DOLS controls 
VARIABLES log_qpl15_gdp log_qpl15_gdp 
log_qvlc15_gdp 0.940*** 0.893*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) 
nxdebt_gdp  -0.011** 
  (0.005) 
lntot_eff  -2.119 
  (1.454) 
open  -0.286*** 
  (0.024) 
gov_gdp  0.014*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.210** 0.247** 
 (0.104) (0.119) 
   
Observations 511 469 
R-squared 0.901 0.924 
Year FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notations: 
log_qvlc15_gdp: relative per capita GDP measured at constant, 2010 PPP 
 
To sum up, as compared to the results of the related literature, covering a larger sample of countries, 
in our sample including the EU27, the long term coefficient between external relative prices and 
relative indicators of development can be regarded as high. Per capita income (productivity) explains 
the bulk of the variation in relative price developments. The coefficient is even higher, close to unity 
when the equation is estimated with variables measured at constant PPPs. The explanation is likely 
to be related to the fact that the relationship measured at constant prices and PPP is unaffected by 
changes in methodology and composition, affecting comparisons at current PPPs.  
The relationship between relative GDP variables and relative internal prices is similarly strong, with 
the slope being less steep. However, for some countries, the misalignment implied by the internal 
relative price differs significantly from the one estimated using the external price level. The 
difference between the measurements of misalignments is typically lower in CEE countries, where 
the internal relative price and the external price levels move closely together.  
5.2.2 Stability tests and cross country yearly estimations 
As a robustness check, we present estimations from the cross-country estimations estimated year by 
year to present the evolution of the estimated parameter of GDP per capita. For this comparison, we 
present the simplest panel estimations with fixed time effect, and no control variables. As Figure 5.1 
shows, the estimated long term coefficient of relative development (measured by per capita GDP) 
does not show any definite trend, and the coefficient from the panel estimation lies in the 
confidence interval of the cross-country estimations in the entire period.   
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Figure 5.1: Long term coefficient of GDP per capita on relative price level (measured by current PPP) in 
yearly cross-country regressions and panel estimation regressions 
 
Notations:β denotes the estimated long term parameter of relative price level(log_pl15_gdp) on per capita GDP 
(log_vlc15_gdp) 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
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6. The effect of RER-misalignments on economic growth 
6.1. Our approach  
In this section we investigate the relationship between RER-misalignments and growth. Though 
several papers estimated these effects, the results are hard to compare, not only because of the 
different samples, but also because of differences in interpreting the concept of misalignment, 
economic growth or in the stage of development considered in estimating the development-
consistent level of the RER.  
The novelty of our approach is that we systematically compare the growth effect of misalignments 
based on measures relying on both the external relative price level of GDP and the internal relative 
price of services to goods; in addition, we apply different concepts of economic growth and consider 
the impact of stages of development on our results. Furthermore, we address the heterogeneity in 
the growth effects of misalignment with respect to the exchange rate regime, sign and size of the 
misalignment, as well as the level of development.  
Our basic growth regression, similarly to Rodrik’s (2008), is the following:  
𝑑 log(𝑌𝑡𝑖) = 𝛼𝑡 + β log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇0,𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿) + Γ𝑿𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 
𝑑 log(𝑌𝑡𝑖)  denotes three different measures of the economic growth of country i in year t: (i) 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP at current PPP relative to the EU15 average (𝑉𝐿𝐶𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖); (ii) 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita at constant (2010) prices (𝑄𝐶_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖), (iii) annual growth rate 
of GDP at constant PPP of the year 2010 (𝑄_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑖). 
log (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇0,𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿) is the value of the per capita GDP relative to EU15, measured at current PPP in the 
first year of 5 year blocks: 1995, 2000, 2005,2010,2015. This variable captures the effect beta 
convergence. 
𝑿𝑡𝑖 stands for the following control variables. Free: Heritage Foundation economic freedom index; 
Infl: HICP, annual rate of change; Gov_def: deficit of consolidated government as a % of GDP; 
Inv_gdp: fixed capital formation, as a % of GDP. The other control variables used in the literature 
proved to be insignificant, and as the data coverage was not full for these variables, we decided to 
drop them from the estimation (years of education, life expectancy, terms of trade).  
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖 represents RER-misalignment measured in four different ways. The specific indicators 
differ along two dimensions, as we use two different RER indicators and two different concepts for 
the level of development. Accordingly, we calculate misalignment of the (i) external price level of 
GDP and that of the (ii) internal relative price, which, in turn, are interpreted as the deviation of an 
actual RER from the level consistent with relative (iii) per capita real income or the (iv) productivity 
(GDP per worker) of a country.  
Our baseline results rest on estimated misalignments in which the long term relationship is 
calculated without control variables, that is, relying only on the relationship between the RER and the 
respective indicator of relative development. The reason is that the models with control-adjusted 
misalignments have lower explanatory power; these indicators proved to be insignificant in most of 
the cases, suggesting that simple misalignments are more closely related to growth than control-
adjusted misalignments. However, we present growth regressions with control-based misalignments 
in the Appendix C. 
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One might argue that adding the contemporaneous misalignment as an explanatory variable raises 
the danger of endogeneity. Indeed, the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable, the direction of 
causality from/towards growth is not straightforward and the same shock might influence both 
variables. For example, if a negative GDP shock reduces growth, and if prices and exchange rate react 
with a lag, this will move misalignment upwards (toward overvaluation) and might bias the 
coefficient in the negative direction. However, the endogeneity problem concerns mainly the 
regressions where the dependent variable and the misalignment reflect the same income concept, 
namely, per capita income at current PPP relative to the EU15 (vlc15_gdp). As we will demonstrate, 
when economic growth is measured by the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (or GDP by itself) at 
constant prices, and misalignment is calculated as the deviation of the RER consistent with 
productivity (GDP per worker measured at current PPP), the endogeneity problem is less of an issue. 
However, we respond to the endogeneity problem also by using lagged values and instrumental 
variable estimation. We do not use country specific constants in our baseline the regression, that is, 
the comparative levels of misalignments and their differences across countries also have an impact 
on the results. Fixed effect GMM estimations are presented in Appendix D.  
6.2. Results 
6.2.1. Baseline results: levels and changes  
Tables 6.1-and 6-2 show the results of our baseline growth regressions based on the level of the 
contemporaneous misalignment. The parameter is negative for all specifications, suggesting, in line 
with the common finding in the literature, that an under/overvalued real exchange rate – relative to 
its development-consistent, “neutral” level – is positively/negatively associated with 
contemporaneous growth.  
Two important conclusions arise from the results. First, the results are broadly similar for different 
growth measures and different concepts of the level of development used for calculating the neutral 
RER. However, the effect is not, or only weakly, significant in case of price level misalignment, if the 
neutral RER is calculated with per capita GDP, suggesting that productivity-based misalignments have 
a slightly stronger effect.  
Second, misaligned internal relative prices affect growth even stronger than “inadequate” external 
relative price levels. This result highlights that when the real exchange rate misalignment is reflected 
in relative price distortions between (mainly tradable) goods and (mainly non-tradable) services, the 
resulting non-optimal allocation of resources adversely influences growth.  
In line with our convergence estimations, the initial level of development – the relative GDP per 
capita in the first year of 5-year blocks – is highly significant in all specifications; the value of the 
parameter is higher in case of per capita items. This result is robust to the variable applied for 
measuring the “initial” level of development: both beta convergence and the other variables are 
similar when using the relative per capita GDP of the first year of the sample (1995 or 2009) or that 
of the previous year.  
Higher inflation and government deficit is associated with lower growth in most specifications. The 
government deficit is significantly negative with a high coefficient: a 1 percent higher deficit/GDP 
ratio is accompanied with a lower growth by 0.15-0.2 percentage points. The composite index of 
economic freedom – that contains sub-indices among others for property rights, government 
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efficiency and rule of law – is significantly positive, although the parameter can be regarded as small. 
The parameter of the investment-to- GDP ratio is also significantly positive. 48 
 
Table 6.1: The effect of misalignment-level: the external price level of GDP (pl15_gdp) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference for 
misalignment  VLC VLW 
Dep. var(dlog) vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
misal -0.020* -0.018* -0.021** -0.022** -0.021*** -0.026*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
log_vlc15_gdp_i5 -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
infl -0.088*** -0.084*** -0.073*** 0.129*** -0.077*** -0.065*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.039) (0.009) (0.009) 
inv_gdp 0.126*** 0.101*** 0.123*** -0.081*** 0.102*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.040) (0.035) (0.033) (0.009) (0.034) (0.032) 
gov_def -0.186*** -0.168*** -0.161*** -0.202*** -0.184*** -0.180*** 
 
(0.056) (0.047) (0.045) (0.059) (0.048) (0.047) 
free 0.053** 0.056** 0.057*** 0.063** 0.066*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
       Observations 563 563 563 563 563 563 
R-squared 0.407 0.629 0.602 0.409 0.631 0.606 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
     
                                                          
48
 The effect of the inflation, government deficit and invesmnet GDP is similar in the fixed effect specifications, 
that is, when only the within variation is used for identification. However, economic freedom usually looses 
significace in fixed effect models, as the within variation is much less important at this variable.  
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Table 6.2.: The effect of misalignment-level: the internal relative price of services to goods (RP_sg) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference for 
misalignment  VLC VLW 
Dep. var(dlog) vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
misal -0.026** -0.025*** -0.021** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
log_vlc15_gdp_i5 -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
infl -0.051 -0.054* -0.032 -0.035 -0.037 -0.014 
 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) 
inv_gdp 0.160*** 0.130*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.130*** 0.157*** 
 
(0.044) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043) (0.037) (0.035) 
gov_def -0.145** -0.129*** -0.124*** -0.158*** -0.142*** -0.134*** 
 
(0.057) (0.047) (0.045) (0.057) (0.047) (0.045) 
free 0.056** 0.059** 0.061*** 0.065** 0.068*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) 
       Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.403 0.632 0.608 0.407 0.635 0.612 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           
 
Following Oblath et al. (2015), we also estimated the regression using the first order difference of 
misalignments, where the results show the effect of changes in misalignment. 
However, the endogeneity problem is more pronounced in this specification, as the change of the 
misalignment is the linear combination of the change in per capita GDP and the change of the real 
exchange rate. Specifically, regressions (1) and (3) in table 6.3 and 6.4 suffer from an endogeneity 
bias, as the dependent variable uses the same concept of income as the calculation of misalignment 
does: the relative per capita GDP at current PPP (vlc15_gdp). This problem is reflected in the 
following two tables, which summarize the effect of changes in misalignments based on the external 
price level and the internal relative price, respectively, on different growth indicators. The results for 
external price level and internal relative prices are similar. The estimated effect of the change in 
misalignment on relative per capita GDP growth at current PPP is much stronger than its effect on 
GDP growth measured at constant prices. However, the effect of productivity-based change in 
misalignment on GDP growth proved to be insignificant in case of both RER indicators. We estimated 
the following regression: 
𝑑 log(𝑌𝑡𝑖) = α + βlog(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇0,1  
𝑅𝐸𝐿 ) + Γ𝑿𝑡𝑖 + 𝜕 𝑑( 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙)𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
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Table 6.3. Effect of misalignment-change: external price level of GDP (PL_gdp) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference for 
misalignment  VLC VLW 
Dep. variable (dlog) vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
D.misal -0.306*** -0.152*** -0.141*** -0.213*** -0.059** -0.049* 
 
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) 
log_vlc15_gdp_i5 -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
infl -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.074*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
inv_gdp 0.145*** 0.122*** 0.150*** 0.157*** 0.128*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) 
gov_def -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.129*** -0.177*** -0.158*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) 
free 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.053** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
       
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 
0.571 0.659 0.628 0.487 0.630 0.601 0.571 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           
Table 6.4: Effect of misalignment-change: internal relative price (rp_sg) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference for 
misalignment  VLC VLW 
Dep. variable (dlog) vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp vlc15_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
D.misal -0.378*** -0.196*** -0.172*** -0.253*** -0.063 -0.038 
 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) 
log_vlc15_gdp_i5 -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
infl -0.034 -0.053* -0.031 -0.054 -0.066* -0.043 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
inv_gdp 0.188*** 0.148*** 0.176*** 0.196*** 0.146*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) 
gov_def -0.111** -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.154*** -0.141*** -0.135*** 
 
(0.047) (0.042) (0.040) (0.052) (0.045) (0.043) 
free 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
       
Observations 509 509 509 509 509 509 
R-squared 0.551 0.688 0.657 0.486 0.665 0.636 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.2.2 Specific issues related to the effect of misalignments 
What has changed after the crisis?  
In the following, we investigate whether the effect of the misalignments have changed since the 
financial crisis. Though the long-term parameter doesn’t exhibit structural change, one might argue 
that the effect of misalignment behaves differently in the period starting from 2009.  
The structural break was measured by adding an interaction term between misalignment and a 
dummy that is equal to 1 in the period 2009-2016. The results, shown in table 6.5, reveal a mixed 
picture. While the misalignment in the external price level proved to be significantly stronger in the 
post-crisis period, there is no sign of a structural break in the case of misalignment in internal relative 
prices. The interaction term between misalignment and the dummy variable for the period after 
2009 is also significant in the fixed-effect specifications (see Appendix D). The stronger effect of 
misalignment in the external price level might be driven by the Mediterranean countries, where the 
crisis resulted in a sharp fall in their relative GDP that was accompanied by a less marked decline in 
their external price level.  
 
Table 6.5. : Effect of the misalignment: looking for structural break in 2009   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in misal External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference for  
misal VLC VLW 
Dep. 
var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
                  
misal 0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.026** -0.023** -0.032*** -0.035*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
misald2009 -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.038** -0.031* 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Obs 563 563 563 563 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.638 0.611 0.636 0.610 0.632 0.608 0.635 0.613 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
Effect of lagged misalignment 
Although most estimations use the contemporaneous measure of misalignment in growth 
regressions, the question arises whether or not real exchange rate misalignment exerts its effect with 
a lag. We tested this by adding the lagged value of the misalignment, instead of the 
contemporaneous value, into the growth regressions. The results are shown in table 6.6. Lagged 
misalignment proved to be significantly negative in case of productivity based misalignments, but the 
misalignment based on lagged per capita GDP has no significant effect. An important feature of the 
specification with lagged misalignment is that potential bias arising from contemporenous shocks 
decelerating growth and increasing the misalignment at the same time is ruled out.49 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
49
 The coefficient of the vlc15_gdp-based misalignment in the regression with vlc15_gdp as a growth variable 
proved to be significantly positive that arises from the cointegration of relative per capita GDP and the relative 
price level of GDP.   
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the lagged misalginment migh have an indirect effect though the lagged growth, hence the lagged 
specification does not fully ensure that the coefficient of misalginment captures causal relationship.  
Table 6.6 : Effect of lagged misalignment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in misal External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference for  
in misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
L.misal 0.004 -0.001 -0.014* -0.019** -0.013* -0.012 -0.024*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Observations 562 562 562 562 509 509 509 509 
R-squared 0.625 0.597 0.628 0.602 0.664 0.636 0.669 0.643 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
 
Heterogeneity in the effect of the misalignment: the exchange rate regime, non-linearity and CEEU-
countries 
Fixed vs. floating exchange rate regime countries 
The question arises whether the relationship between misalignments and growth depends on the 
exchange rate regime. Our estimation shows that the negative effect of misalignment on growth is 
attributable mainly to countries with fixed exchange rates, moreover, as Table 6.8 shows, the growth 
effect of the misalignment in some specifications is significantly positive when the exchange rate is 
not fixed.50 This result is robust to the growth variable and to whether the calculation of 
misalignment is based on productivity or GDP per capita, and to the real exchange rate applied.51 
Habib et al (2016) also find that the growth effect of misalignment is stronger in pegs. 
Next, we investigated whether differences in the behaviour of misalignments, namely the magnitude 
and persistence might account for the observed differences in the growth effect of the misalignment. 
The effect of the exchange rate regime on the average size and the persistence of the misalignment 
is not straightforward. On one hand, under flexible exchange rates, price adjustments might 
materialize also through exchange rate changes, that can promote cross country price convergence if 
nominal prices are stickier than the nominal exchange rate. In turn, under fixed exchange rate, in lack 
of nominal exchange rate adjustment, misalignments might be more persistent and sizable. On the 
other hand, excessive nominal exchange volatility might be a source of destabilizing shocks itself and 
may increase the volatility of the real exchange rate (e.g. Berka et al., 2012). Moreover, fixed 
exchange rates – by decreasing transaction costs – might enhance trade and hence induce cross-
country price convergence (e.g. Rose, 2000).  
                                                          
50
 We also investigated whether the exchange rate regime influences the longt term real exchange rate, but the 
dummy for fixed exchange rate proved to be insignificant in all specifications for the long-term relationship. 
51
 Moreover, heterogeneity in the growth effect of misalignment with respect to the exchange rate is prevalent 
also in fixed effect specifications.  
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In our sample, the average size and the standard deviation of misalignments is even smaller in fixed 
exchange rate countries (see Table 9.). The persistence of misalignments is measured similarly to 
Fidora et al. (2017), who measure persistence by the γ parameter in regression (3), that shows the 
responsiveness of the real exchange rate to past misalignments. The negative parameter indicates 
mechanisms moving the real exchange rate toward the neutral level. The higher is the absolute value 
of the parameter, the lower is the persistence of the misalignment. The regression is similar to the 
short term ECM equations, with the main difference that our regression captures long term, five year 
changes in the exchange rate. 
𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡/𝑡−5,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡/𝑡−5,𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡−5,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (3) 
𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡/𝑡−5,𝑖 and 𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡/𝑡−5,𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐿  denotes the change in the real exchange (external price level and 
internal relative price) and variables of relative development (per capita or per worker GDP) 
compared to its’s value five years earlier, and 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡−5,𝑖 denotes the corresponding misalignment 
lagged with five years.  
The estimated persistence exhibits a mixed picture (see Table 10.) External price level misalignments 
proved to be somewhat more persistent in fixed exchange rate countries, however, internal relative 
price misalignments show larger persistency for floating countries, but the difference is not 
particularly sizable in either case. We get similar results, if we estimate regression (3) with country 
fixed effect and investigate persistence for a shorter time span, three or four years.  
 
Table 6.8: Estimates of asymmetric effects of misalignment-level: fixed exchange rate countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in 
misal External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference 
for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
variable 
var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
                  
misal 0.021** 0.020* 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
misal*fix -0.097*** -0.104*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.068*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Obs 563 563 563 563 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.629 0.614 0.627 0.611 0.649 0.625 0.655 0.632 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.9: Summary statistics for misalignment for fixed and floating exchange rate countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
 Floating exchange rate 
mis_rp_vlc 209 -0.04 0.15 -0.38 0.35 
mis_rp_vlw 209 -0.03 0.16 -0.44 0.40 
mis_pl_vlc 263 -0.01 0.16 -0.60 0.32 
mis_pl_vlw 263 0.00 0.17 -0.44 0.42 
 Fixed exchange rate 
mis_rp_vlc_cont 327 -0.01 0.11 -0.33 0.23 
mis_rp_vlw_cont 327 -0.01 0.11 -0.36 0.17 
mis_pl_vlc_cont 329 0.00 0.10 -0.19 0.25 
mis_pl_vlw_cont 329 0.01 0.12 -0.28 0.36 
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Table 6.10: Persistence of misalignment for fixed and floating exchange rate countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
misalignment mis_pl_vlc mis_pl_vlw mis_rp_vlc mis_rp_vlw 
d.RER (t/t-5) S5.log_pl15_gdp S5.log_pl15_gdp S5.log_rp_s_g S5.log_rp_s_g 
 
floating fix floating fix floating fix floating fix 
                  
L5.misal -0.362*** -0.243*** -0.275*** -0.212*** -0.146*** -0.220*** -0.131*** -0.159*** 
 
(0.053) (0.038) (0.053) (0.030) (0.044) (0.034) (0.041) (0.031) 
log_vlc15_gdp(t/t-5) 0.561*** 0.486*** 
  
0.272*** 0.190*** 
  
 
(0.083) (0.033) 
  
(0.058) (0.029) 
  log_vlw15_gdp(t/t-5) 
  
0.610*** 0.592*** 
  
0.253*** 0.298*** 
   
(0.084) (0.044) 
  
(0.059) (0.039) 
Constant 0.023* 0.010*** 0.012 0.008* -0.008 0.004 -0.004 0.003 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) 
         Observations 154 300 154 300 108 293 108 293 
R-squared 0.334 0.440 0.331 0.395 0.266 0.288 0.218 0.250 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
Nonlinearity: Sign and size heterogeneity in the effect of RER misalignment  
Many papers find that overvaluation hinders, while undervaluation enhances growth. Our baseline 
specification – where misalignment is represented with its sign – also implies that not only the 
distance, but also the sign of the deviation from the “neutral” level matters, that is, overvaluation 
effects growth in an opposite way as undervaluation.52 However, one might question whether the 
magnitude of the effect depends on the sign of the misalignment. If prices and wages can be 
characterized by asymmetric downward rigidity, the adverse effect of overvaluation might be 
stronger than the favorable growth effect of the undervaluation. On the other hand, Rodrik (2008) 
found that for developing countries, an increase the positive effect of undervaluation is at just as 
powerful as the negative growth effect of overvaluation.  
In addition to the sign, the size of the misalignment might also influence the growth effect of 
misalignment. Bereau et al (2012) find that the growth effect of the misalignment is not linear, but 
increases with the size. Aquierre and Calderon (2005) investigated non-linearity separately for 
undervaluation and overvaluation and found that the size of the misalignment indeed matters, but 
while large overvaluations are excessively harmful, the positive effect of undervaluation loses 
momentum with increasing the magnitude and becomes negative above a certain level. Rodrik 
(2008) found little evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between real exchange rate 
misalignment and economic growth. 
We tested the sign and size asymmetries, adding overvaluation, undervaluation and the squared 
values of overvaluation and undervaluation separately. In case of undervaluation, the squared value 
is multiplied by minus one. (Similar methodology was applied by Aquirre and Calderon, 2005). 
The added variables are the following:  
                                                          
52
 If only the absolute size of misalignments were considered, it would not be possible to differentiate between 
the effects of over- and undervaluations. 
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𝑢_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡   where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1, if the currency is undervalued and zero if overvalued. 
Consequently,  𝑜_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 . 
𝑠𝑞_𝑢_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡    is the squared value of 𝑢_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ,  multiplied by -1, and  𝑠𝑞_𝑜_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡   is the square 
of   𝑜_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
Our results (Table 6.11) suggest that the effect of misalignment in external price levels exhibits 
similar size and sign heterogeneity as in Aguierre and Calderon (2005). Larger overvaluations seem to 
be more devastating than moderate ones; this effect is captured by the negative coefficient of 
squared overvaluation – however, the parameter is significant only at 10%. Moderate 
undervaluations have positively associated with growth, nevertheless, this diminishes with increasing 
magnitude, as the coefficient of the squared undervaluation is significantly positive. Consequently, a 
country cannot expect much gain from an excessively undervalued real exchange rate, and the 
parameter values imply that above 25-30 percent the positive effect turns negative. This result is 
more in line with the so called “Washington Consensus”53 which states that large misalignments 
imply significant distortions and imbalances that are harmful for growth in both directions; the result 
is also in line with Oblath et al (2015). However, misaligned internal relative prices do not  show this 
type of asymmetry. Both the values and the squared value of overvaluation loses significance in this 
specification, and the overvaluation shows diminishing negative effect. One explanation might be 
that while the level of misaligned internal relative prices do have significantly negative effect, the 
threshold between under- and overvaluation is not estimated precisely.   
Table 6. 11: Testing for nonlinear effects 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RER in misal External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference for 
misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. variable 
var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
o_misal -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.166*** -0.176*** -0.073 -0.081* -0.039 -0.044 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) 
u_misal 0.064 0.046 0.004 -0.013 -0.025 -0.013 -0.084** -0.083** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.039) 
misal_sq_u 0.355*** 0.390*** 0.620*** 0.666*** 0.143 0.177 0.029 0.030 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.143) (0.146) (0.136) (0.139) (0.104) (0.106) 
misal_sq_o -0.494* -0.446* -0.061 -0.020 0.153 0.147 0.324** 0.369*** 
 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.112) (0.114) (0.157) (0.155) (0.129) (0.127) 
Obs 563 563 563 563 522 522 522 522 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
Asymmetry with respect to CEEU countries 
A common finding in the literature is that in highly developed countries growth is less affected by 
RER misalignment (e.g. McDonald and Vieira, 2010) or is completely unaffected (Rodrik, 2008). These 
estimations are based on a mixed sample of developed and developing countries. The EU is more 
homogenous in terms of GDP per capita than the above samples, however, differences in the stage 
                                                          
53
 See e.g., Edwards(1989) 
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of development also play a role within the EU. We investigate whether an asymmetry exists between 
developed EU countries and the newcomer CEEU countries. Despite the substantial convergence of 
CEEU countries, the group as a whole lags behind in terms of GDP per capita throughout the period. 
Beyond the lag in the level of development, CEEU countries might behave differently because of the 
structural differences inherited from the socialist era.  
Table 6.12: Average level of development and RER indicators in CEEU and non-CEEU countries, 
EU15=100  
  
non CEEU   CEEU   non CEEU CEEU 
  VLC15_GDP VLW15_GDP PL15_GDP VLC15_GDP VLW15_GDP PL15_GDP   RP_SG RP_SG 
 1995-
2016 98 98 97 51 54 52 
 1999-
2016 96 56 
1995 94 94 95 39 39 44 1999 94 49 
2008 100 100 99 58 60 62 2008 96 60 
2016 97 97 98 64 66 59 2016 95 59 
Notations: vlc_gdp: per capita GDP measured on current PPP, EU15==100, vlw_gdp: per employed person  GDP measured 
on current PPP, EU15==100, PL_GDP: Price level of GDP measured on current PPP,EU15==100; RP_S_g: relative price of 
services to goods,  EU15=100.   
The asymmetry is tested by adding the interaction term of misalignment and the dummy variable for 
CEEU countries to our basic regression. The results are mixed across growth and misalignment 
measurements and show asymmetry only for external price level misalignments. As table 6.13.A 
shows, the cross-term is insignificant in case of misalignment in internal relative prices, but it is 
significantly positive in case of external price based misalignment, which counteracts the negative 
coefficient of misalignment. Running the equation (1) on CEEU and non-CEEU countries separately 
(table 6.13.B) shows that the overall effect of external price level misalignment is negative, but 
insignificant. Only misaligned internal relative prices have significant effect on growth in CEEU 
countries. The effect of misaligned relative internal prices is similar in CEEU and non CEEU 
countries.54 
As the level of GDP per capita of some CEEU countries (e.g. Slovenia, Czech Republic) has exceeded 
that of less developed periphery countries in the past few years, we also tested the heterogeneity by 
the GDP per capita, and received similar results (see Appendix E)  
The important takeaway from this table is that within the EU, less developed countries do not react 
more strongly to exchange rate misalignments, that is, our results do not confirm the usual finding in 
the literature (e.g. Rodrik, 2008) that misaligned real exchange rates have stronger growth effects in 
countries with lower GDP per capita. However, one has to note that while the majority of developed 
EU countries (except UK and Sweden) have been operating under a fixed exchange rate regime since 
1997, CEEU countries exhibit more heterogeneous picture regarding the exchange rate regime. 55  
                                                          
54
 The same result arises by adding the cross term of the CEEU dummy and misalignment to the original level 
growth regression on the whole sample. In this case, the significantly positive cross term counterweights the 
negative misalignment coefficient for the price level, but the cross-term is significant for internal relative 
prices. 
55 Since 1995, the following CEEU countries operated under fixed exchange rate regime: BU, EE, LT, LV; since 
2007: SI, since 2009: SK 
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Table 6. 13. A) Estimates for asymmetric effect on CEEU countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference 
for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. var 
var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
                  
misal -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.020* -0.022* -0.035*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
misal*ceeu 0.040** 0.050*** 0.026* 0.032** -0.010 0.001 0.011 0.019 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Obs 563 563 563 563 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.631 0.608 0.633 0.609 0.632 0.608 0.635 0.614 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
        
Table 6. 13.B) Estimates for asymmetric effect on CEEU countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference for 
misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep.var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
  
  CEEU countries  
     
misal -0.012 -0.016 -0.019 -0.023 -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 229 229 229 229 194 194 194 194 
R-squared 0.710 0.697 0.712 0.699 0.729 0.718 0.732 0.722 
         
 non- CEEU countries  
misal -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.053*** -0.058*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Observations 334 334 334 334 328 328 328 328 
R-squared 0.671 0.685 0.677 0.696 0.665 0.674 0.680 0.694 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
GMM estimations 
Some of our main findings are robust to the applied panel econometric method. In addition to time 
fixed effect specifications, we carried out system and difference GMM methods for estimating the 
growth-misalignment relationship, specifying the misalignment as an endogenous variable, hence 
addressing the potential endogeneity bias. We used two sets of misalignments in the GMM 
estimations. First, the long term relationship was also estimated with adding country fixed effects. 
Second, we also ran the GMM with our baseline misalignment estimated without country fixed 
effects (this is the approach of Rodrik(2008)). The results are presented in Appendix D2-D5. Time 
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effect and country fixed effect estimations yielded simiar results in our GMM estimations.56 These 
estimations confirm the negative relationship between misalignments in case of external relative 
prices for fixed exchange rate countries. GMM specifications do not show significant asymmetry for 
CEEU countries and also show that the positive undervaluation-growth relationship diminishes with 
increasing size of undervaluation.  
6.2.3. Channels: investment and competitiveness  
From a policy point of view, a key question regarding the growth effect of RER misalignment is the 
transmission channel through which misalignment exerts its effect on the growth. The three main 
channels identified by the literature point to a symmetric effect in the sense that undervaluation 
enhances and overvaluation hinders growth, that is the direction of the deviation from the value 
implied by fundamentals have a great importance.  
The conventional competitiveness channel (e.g. Obsfeld and Rogoff, 1996) argues that a more 
undervalued RER increases the profitability of the export sector and enhances growth through 
conjuncture in exports, while the increase in the price of imports increases the growth via the 
expenditure switching mechanism.  
The another main channel emphasizes the role of capital accumulation in the in the positive effect 
growth effect of RER undervaluation. Rodrik (2008) argues that an undervalued RER enhances 
investment and production in the tradable sector, but only in developing countries, where bad 
institutions and market failure lead to a suboptimal share of the tradable sector, which suffers more 
from the institutional weakness. Other papers emphasize the positive effect of RER undervaluation 
on overall savings and investments, implying that the beneficial ipmact on investment is not limited 
to the tradable sector (e.g. Bhalla 2007). 
A related mechanism, the total factor productivity channel (e.g. Mbaye, 2012), also considers 
increased profitability of the tradable sector as a starting point, but the focus is rather on 
compositional changes in the economy. Namely, production shifts from the low-productivity non-
tradable sector towards the more productive tradable sector, ultimately increasing the overall 
productivity of the economy.  
In the following, we try to identify the importance of the competitiveness and the investment 
channels by applying the investment to GDP ratio and the change in export market share at 
international markets as dependent variables instead of GDP growth. Specifically, we estimate 
equation (1) using an indicator of investment and that of competitiveness as the dependent variable 
and modify the set of control variables.  
The variables are the following: 
dlog_ms: the competitiveness channel is investigated by an indicator expressing market performance 
of exports of goods and services on export weighted imports of goods and services: 36 industrial 
markets 2010=100 (AMECO). The variable is represented in dlog form. 
inv: the investment channel is represented by gross capital formation as percent of GDP. 
Our results (tables 6.14-6.15) suggest that both investments and the competitiveness are related to 
RER misalignments. The contemporaneous level of misalignment is negatively associated with 
changes in export market shares and the investment/GDP ratio; the results are similar for 
                                                          
56
 The similarity of the results is not surprising, as GMM mainly uses the within country variation, thus the 
average level of the RER within a country does not play a role, even if misalignment is estimated without contry 
fixed effects.  
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misalignment in the external price level and the internal relative price. The results are also robust to 
the measure of the level of development (GDP per capita and productivity) considered for measuring 
misalignment. The index of economic freedom affects the change in market share positively in all 
specifications. It is worth noting that effect of the terms of trade differs for competitiveness and 
investment. An increase in the terms of trade worsens export performance, that is, higher relative 
export prices are accompanied by lower quantities. However, changes in the terms of trade have no 
significant effect on the investment/GDP ratio.  
System and difference GMM estimations for the relationship between misalignments and growth are 
are presented in Appendix F.  
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Table 6.14: Effect of RER misalignment level on investment/GDP and export market share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference in mis VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. var dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp 
                  
misal -0.050*** -0.110*** -0.047*** -0.068*** -0.075*** -0.090*** -0.070*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
log_vlw15_gdp_i
5 -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
free 0.080* 0.138*** 0.105** 0.178*** 0.068 0.084*** 0.099** 0.123*** 
 
(0.043) (0.029) (0.043) (0.030) (0.045) (0.031) (0.044) (0.031) 
tot_eff -1.463*** -0.139 -1.420*** -0.064 -1.902*** -0.013 -1.844*** 0.040 
 
(0.540) (0.249) (0.539) (0.250) (0.544) (0.222) (0.545) (0.225) 
         Observations 557 558 557 558 520 520 520 520 
R-squared 0.182 0.392 0.184 0.333 0.236 0.383 0.235 0.349 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
The lagged effects of misalignments on investment per GDP and market share are similarly negative 
and significant, confirming that our results are not driven by contemporenaous endogeneity bias.  
It is to be noted that our evidence indicating the important role of the competitiveness and the 
investment channel does not imply that we rule out the operation of the channel involving total 
factor productivity. However, since it is not straightforward to empirically disentangle the increase in 
capital/labor ratio from that in total factor productivity, we cannot draw conclusions on the existence 
of this mechanism. 
Table 6.15: Lagged effect of misalignment on market share and investment/GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
GDP in mis VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep.var dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp 
                  
L.misal -0.037** -0.102*** -0.041*** -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.054*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
Observations 557 557 557 557 508 508 508 508 
R-squared 0.176 0.384 0.180 0.334 0.230 0.390 0.230 0.358 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. The effect of misalignments based on the relationship between wage and productivity 
levels: an extension 
In section 5 we estimated alternative indicators of relative price misalignments, based on the 
relationship between external (and internal) relative prices on the one hand, and the level of 
development, on the other. These indicators can rightly be considered as reflections of RER 
misalignments, since the external relative price of GDP and the internal relative price of services to 
goods are alternative expressions of the real exchange rate. As an extension to, and a robustness-
check of, our findings concerning the relationship between RER misalignments and economic growth 
(discussed in section 6), in the present section we analyse the misalignment – growth relationship in 
light of misalignments of relative wage levels from relative productivity levels. The concept of wages 
in our analysis corresponds to the national accounts: compensation of employees (gross wages and 
salaries plus employers’ social contributions). This implies that we consider wages as gross labour 
costs (comparable to GDP per labour-input), rather than net labour income (comparable with, e.g., 
net domestic income).  
The concept of relative “wage misalignment” is analogous to, but not identical with, relative price 
(i.e., RER-) misalignment. The relationship between the level of wages and productivity is unaffected 
by the RER, since the two items can be compared either as nominal magnitudes, expressed in euro 
(producer nominal wage vs. nominal productivity), or both may be deflated by the external relative 
price of GDP (producer real wage vs. real productivity). What we are interested in is (i) whether 
misalignments of wages and prices show a similar pattern; if so, (ii) whether the correspondence 
between misalignments and growth, based on wages and productivity show a similar pattern to the 
one based on RER and income levels.  
Figure 7.1: The relationship between the log of (a) the external relative price level (b) the internal 
relative price of services to goods and per capita GDP; (c) relative producer real wages and relative 
productivity based on the number of persons; (d) hours worked  
                   (a)                                           (b)                                          (c)                                           (d) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and AMECO 
The visual observation of figure 7.1, displaying the relationships based on pooled cross-section data, 
clearly suggests that the association between wages and productivity [panels (c) and (d)] is 
somewhat closer than those based on relative prices and real incomes [panels (a) and (b)].  
The relationship between productivity and wages can be interpreted on the basis of the number 
persons (employed for productivity and employees for wages, figure 7.1.c) or hours worked by 
persons employed and employees, respectively (figure 7.1.d).  
The level of producer nominal wage per employee and per worked hours respectively in country i, 
relative to the EU average (in log):  
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𝑛𝑝𝑤15𝑖,𝐸𝑈𝑅
𝑏 = (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝑏)- (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑈,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝐸𝑈
𝑏 ) 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝐸𝑈𝑅 denotes compensation of employees expressed in euros,  
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝑏 denotes 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝑤 (the number of employees), or 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑖
ℎ (hours worked by employees) in a 
given year.  
Producer real wage per employee and per hours worked, respectively, in country i relative to the EU 
average: 
𝑟𝑝𝑤15𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑏 = (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝑏 − 𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖/𝐸𝑈)- (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑈,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝐸𝑈
𝑏 ) 
Relative per hour or per worker (real) productivity in country in country i, relative to the EU average: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑15𝑖
𝑏
 
= (𝑛𝑙15_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖
𝑏 − 𝑃𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖/𝐸𝑈)- (𝑛𝑙15_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝐸𝑈,𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝑏 ) 
where   𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑15𝑖
𝑏=   𝑣𝑙𝑤15𝑖/𝐸𝑈 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑣𝑙ℎ15𝑖/𝐸𝑈, i.e., productivity measured by the number of 
persons employed and hours worked, respectively; 
𝑛𝑙15_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑈𝑅 is the nominal GDP expressed in euros, and 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖
𝑏 =  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖
𝑤, 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖
ℎ is total employment (including self-employed), or the number of hours 
worked, respectively. 
We estimate the following DOLS equations for the producer real wage: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑃𝑊15_𝑏𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷15_𝑏𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝜃𝑗∆log (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷15_𝑏𝑖,𝑡+𝑗)
1
𝑗=−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The LHS of the above equation is the numerator, while the RHS (excluding the dynamic term) is the 
denominator of the indicator of “adjusted wage share” (i.e., adjusted for the ratio of employed 
persons to the number of employees, or for the hours worked by persons employed to employees).  
While the wage share (often referred to as the “real” ULC) is not, the actual (“nominal”) ULC is a RER-
indicator, since the latter involves a comparison between nominal wages (affected by the exchange 
rate) and real productivity. Comparing the evolution of the ULC over time between countries 
certainly makes sense, as it shows developments in an important aspect of cost-competitiveness. 
However, it makes little sense to compare nominal wages (in euro) to real productivity (in PPS) across 
countries at significantly different levels of development, since (i) it simply reproduces what we 
already know (price and nominal wage levels increase along with the level of development); (ii) it 
does not reveal anything about the level of cost-competitiveness of countries at considerably 
different levels of development.  
Turning to the results of our estimations, the long-term relationship between PPP-based relative 
producer wages and relative productivity is even stronger than between relative external or internal 
prices and the level of relative development, suggesting a very close relationship between wages and 
productivity within the EU. The coefficient is close to, but above unity, implying that one percent 
higher relative productivity is accompanied by more than one percent higher relative wage level for 
the EU as a whole (table 7.1).  
Actually, the concept of “wage misalignment”, as quantified by the residuals of the above equation, 
can loosely be interpreted as a lower/higher adjusted wage share than the one that corresponds to 
the level of productivity. The result indicating that the elasticity of wages is higher than unity and the 
constant is significantly negative, implies that the wage share tends to increase with the level of 
productivity. This partially helps in understanding why, in spite of the high explanatory power of 
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productivity regarding wage differentials, large, even 10-20 percentage point differences can be 
observed in adjusted labour shares across countries and over time.57  
Table 7.1: The long-term relationship between relative wages (in PPS) and relative productivity (in 
PPS) based on number of employees (1) and number of hours worked (2) 
 (1) (2) 
   
Dep. var log_𝑟𝑝𝑤15𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒  log_𝑟𝑝𝑤15𝑃𝑃𝑃
ℎ  
   
log_vlw15_gdp 1.032***  
 (0.016)  
log_vlh15_gdp  1.094*** 
  (0.013) 
Constant -0.189*** -0.476*** 
 (0.073) (0.060) 
   
Observations 586 564 
R-squared 0.950 0.965 
Year FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the next step, we look at the relationship between wage misalignment and growth, by applying 
our growth equation presented in Chapter 6. The association between estimated wage 
misalignments and economic growth is similar to the one observed in the case of external and 
internal relative price misalignments. The coefficients are significantly negative regarding both of our 
two growth indicators and both of our measures of wage misalignment (based on per hour and per 
worker): “overvalued” wages are associated with lower growth and vice versa.  
However, the estimated relationship does not allow us to draw conclusions about the causality 
between the two variables. As wages are usually fixed in the beginning of the year, a country specific, 
contemporaneous unexpected decline in growth may increase wage misalignment, resulting in an 
upward-biased estimation. The coefficient of lagged wage misalignment, which does not suffer from 
this contemporaneous bias, is also significantly negative. Nevertheless, the coefficient of lagged 
misalignment might absorb the effect of lagged growth shocks, therefore, an endogeneity bias 
cannot be ruled out. 
As a robustness check, we also carried our fixed-effect estimations, applying fixed-effect DOLS for the 
long term relationship and the  difference and system GMM estimators for the growth regressions, 
defining the misalignment as an endogenous variable. Estimations with country-fixed estimations 
yields parameters that are similar in size and sign, however, the estimated coefficients are not, or 
only weakly significant. This implies that the observed co-movement between the two variables does 
not necessarily result from a causal relationship (for details, see appendix H). 
 
                                                          
57
 An important reason for the positive relationship between cross-country wage shares and levels of 
productivity is the fact that the relative price of consumption to GDP is positively related to the level of 
productivity. Differences in cross-country wage levels tend to reflect not only differentials in productivity, but 
also those in the relative price of consumption, which is closely associated with the relative price of services to 
goods – a major theme of our analyses presented in the previous sections of our study.  
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Table 7.2: Growth regressions with wage misalignments 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
mis_compl_e mis_compl_e mis_compl_h mis_compl_h 
VARIABLES dlog_qc_gdp dlog_q_gdp dlog_qc_gdp dlog_q_gdp 
          
misal -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.044*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 559 559 548 548 
R-squared 0.636 0.609 0.639 0.613 
L.misal -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 557 557 543 543 
R-squared 0.629 0.603 0.629 0.604 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notations: mis_compl_e :  misalignment in wages , based on number of employees 
Notations: mis_compl_h:  misalignment in wages , based on number of worked hours 
Misal is the actual misalignment variable and L.misal denotes its lagged value by one year.  
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8. Summary and conclusions 
The main goals of our study were to investigate (i) the characteristics of real economic and price 
convergence, (ii) the relationship between economic growth (convergence) and real exchange rate 
(RER) misalignments within the European Union (EU) during the period 1995-2016. Although this 
relationship has been analysed by several studies with respect to the global economy (i.e., relying on 
large samples, consisting of countries at markedly different levels of development), very few works 
have been devoted as yet to investigating this association among member-states of the EU. 
We relied on the observation that within the EU there is a very close positive correlation between 
general price levels on the one hand, and levels of economic development, on the other. While the 
existence of this relationship – the so-called “Penn-effect” – is a worldwide phenomenon, it holds 
much more strongly within the EU. This implies that economic integration through trade, capital and 
labour flows does not involve the equalisation of price levels among countries at different levels of 
development; it rather results in an exceptionally close positive association between levels of prices 
and economic development. 
Our interpretation and quantitative estimations of RER misalignments built upon this close 
association: we considered national RERs to be misaligned, if GDP price levels deviate from the 
common trend characterising the relationship between price levels and real incomes (measured by 
per capita GDP at PPP) for the EU as a whole. We referred to points corresponding to the common 
trend as expressing a “neutral” RER; national price levels above (below) the neutral one were 
interpreted as signs of RER-over- (under-) valuation. In this respect, we followed the approach of 
previous studies on the topic.  
However, as an important conceptual and empirical contribution to the literature on RER 
misalignments and economic growth, in addition to the relative external price level of GDP, we 
quantified an alternative indicator for the RER: the internal relative price of services to goods, as 
measured from the expenditure side of GDP. This indicator is also closely correlated with the level of 
economic development and can be regarded as a measure of the “internal” real exchange rate (i.e., 
as a proxy for the relative price of non-tradables to tradables.) We estimated RER-misalignments 
(with, and without controlling for openness and the relative size of government expenditure) relying 
on this concept as well. 
As a background for our further analyses, we reviewed developments regarding sigma and beta 
convergence within the EU with respect to real economic and price convergence (regarding both 
external price levels and internal relative prices) in the period 1995-2016. As for real convergence, 
the “catching up” of the less developed member states to the more affluent ones within the EU was 
expressly rapid in terms of relative per capita growth measured at current PPPs; it was less 
impressive if measured at constant PPPs, and rather modest in terms of relative real GDP-growth 
(i.e., disregarding relative changes in population). Moreover, while the first two indicators point only 
to a deceleration in real economic convergence, the third suggests an effective halt after the global 
economic and financial crisis of 2009. The fact that a significant decline in the absolute size of 
population in the less developed (Central and East-European) member-states has significantly 
contributed – at least in a technical sense – to convergence in terms of per capita GDP within the EU 
has not received sufficient attention as yet. We showed that the overall trend in the world economy 
has been exactly the opposite, i.e., convergence measured by GDP-growth has been more rapid than 
if measured by growth in per capita GDP. However, irrespective of the indicator chosen, the speed of 
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real convergence within the EU has been much higher than in the global economy during the period 
covered by our analysis.  
As for price levels and the relative price of services to goods, a rapid convergence could be observed 
until the international financial crisis, but this process halted in 2008. The convergence of external 
price levels and internal relative prices went roughly hand in hand with real convergence in the 
period as a whole (1995-2016). However, the pre- and post-crisis periods exhibit opposing trends. 
The speed of price convergence exceeded that of real convergence in the period preceding the crisis, 
measured by any indicator. In contrast, the pace of real convergence considerably slowed down, but 
has not been accompanied by any price convergence after the crisis. 
The core of our analyses involves estimation results regarding the relationship between economic 
growth and RER-misalignments within the EU. After having tried several specifications, we finally 
applied four indicators for quantifying misalignments (two based on the external relative price of 
GDP and two on the internal relative price), and two for measuring economic growth (the annual 
growth rate of GDP, as well as per capita GDP, at constant prices).  
Overall, we believe that that our study is novel in in estimating the relationship between real 
exchange rate misalignment and growth across different measures of the RER, the concept of 
economic growth and that of the level of development by applying various panel estimation 
methods. Our results indicate that the contemporaneous extent of real exchange rate misalignment 
– as interpreted by the external relative price of GDP – is negatively associated with economic 
growth: a 10% over/undervaluation is accompanied by 0.2-0.7 percentage point lower/higher rate of 
growth across different specifications in the EU. This effect is substantial, considering the fact that 
the mean annual growth rate of GDP (per capita GDP) was 2.4% (2.3%) in the EU27 over the period 
covered by our analysis. The relationship between growth and misalignments based on internal RERs 
in some cases hold even more than those based on external price levels, highlighting the role of 
relative prices in resource allocation. A robust finding of the study is that the negative association 
between growth and RER-misalignments is mainly attributable to countries operating under fixed 
exchange rate regimes, that is, to Eurozone countries and CEEU countries with pegged exchange 
rates or currency-board arrangements. This finding is robust to the choice of growth indicator, the 
measure of relative level of development and the interpretation of the RER.  
Our results show that, in contrast with the common finding in the literature, the level of 
development does not influence the strength of the relationship between misalignments and 
economic growth. While external price level-based and internal relative price-based misalignments 
behave similarly on the aggregate sample, our findings are mixed regarding the symmetry with 
respect to the size and sign of the misalignment. Specifically, in the case of the external relative price 
level, overvaluation has stronger effect than undervaluation, and while larger overvaluations have an 
excessively negative growth effect, the positive effect of undervaluation diminishes with increasing 
size. The growth effect of internal relative price misalignment does not show this pattern.  
Some of our main findings are robust to the applied panel econometric method. In addition to time 
fixed effect specifications, we carried out system and difference GMM methods, specifying the 
misalignment as an endogenous variable, hence addressing the potential endogeneity bias. The 
GMM estimations confirm the negative relationship between misalignments in case of relative 
external relative prices for fixed exchange rate countries. GMM specifications do not show significant 
asymmetry for CEEU countries and show that the positive undervaluation-growth relationship 
diminishes with increasing size of undervaluation.  
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We addressed two possible channels through which RER misalignments might influence economic 
growth: international competitiveness and the investment rate. The aggregate effect of 
misalignments is significantly negative on both export market shares and the ratio of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP. This result indicates that both the competitiveness and the investment 
channel plays an important role in the growth effect of RER misalignments. 
As an extension, we analysed the relationship between growth and the misalignment of wages from 
productivity levels and found that “wage-misalignments” are also negatively associated with 
economic growth. 
Our results capture contemporaneous and one-year lagged effects of RER misalignments, which are 
highly relevant for understanding growth and convergence in EU member-states in certain sub-
periods of the 21 years covered by our study, but these results do not enable us to draw conclusions 
regarding the long-term effects of misaligned price levels and relative prices.  
It is also important to stress that although our study carries important policy messages – in 
particular, mild real exchange rate undervaluations are positively, while overvaluations are negatively 
associated with growth and real economic convergence – the RER is an endogenous variable, which is 
not under direct policy control. However, there are several policy instruments for indirectly 
influencing the RER, even in countries operating under fixed exchange rates. Our results point to the 
importance of a growth strategy avoiding overvaluation on the one hand, and to the futility of aiming 
at excessive undervaluation, on the other. Rather than trying to achieve an undervalued RER, 
governments are advised to focus on improving the quality of institutions. As shown by our 
estimations, this is one of the important factors that actually matter in the longer term.  
We consider the results presented in this paper as a first step in our attempt to clarify the 
relationship between RER-misalignments and economic growth within the EU. As a next step, it is 
important to build a theorethical model capable of reproducing the empirical results reported in our 
study. As a continuation of our work, we also wish to address issues left open in the present study. 
Two, as yet unexplained, phenomena require further analysis: (i) why does the relationship between 
misalignments and growth hold olnly for countries with fixed exchange rates; (ii) why only 
misalignments based on internal relative prices “work” in the case of CEEU countries? Furthermore, 
the general results of our study need to be ammended by the analysis of individual country-
experiences with respect to the evolution of the RER and economic convergence. These and other 
relevant issues, in particular, the long-term relationship between RER-misalignments and growth are 
to be treated in the next phase of our research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Panel estimations for the speed of convergence 
 
Table A.A.1.Panel estimations: convergence income, based of three indicators of economic growth 
between 1996 and 2016 and in two sub-periods 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
1995-2016 1995-2008 2008-2016 
  
per capita 
GDP, current 
PPP, 
EU15=100 
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices 
GDP, 
constant 
prices  
per capita 
GDP, 
current 
PPP, 
EU15=100 
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices 
GDP, 
constant 
prices  
per capita 
GDP, 
current 
PPP, 
EU15=100 
Per capita 
GDP, 
constant 
prices 
GDP, 
constant 
prices  
alfa -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.015*** 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.190*** 0.140*** 0.091*** 0.198*** 0.153*** 0.107*** 0.030 0.004 -0.062** 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
          Obs 562 562 562 348 348 348 214 214 214 
R-sq 0.623 0.526 0.493 0.422 0.334 0.240 0.631 0.536 0.506 
beta 0.032 0.026 0.014 0.034 0.029 0.018 0.024 0.015 - 
halflife 22 26.5 49.8 20.6 23.7 38.6 29 46.3 - 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
Table A.A.2 Panel Estimation results: convergence in price levels and internal relative prices   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Annual growth  of log_pl15_gdp Annual growth  of log_r_p_sg 
         VARIABL
ES 1995-2016 1995-2008 1999-2016 1999-2008 2008-2016 1999-2016 1999-2008 2008-2016 
                  
alfa -0.037*** -0.051*** -0.028*** -0.043*** 0.004 -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 0.177*** 0.234*** 0.118*** 0.180*** -0.030 0.081*** 0.143*** -0.002 
 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.038) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) 
         Obs 562 348 484 270 214 467 253 214 
R-sq 0.234 0.269 0.215 0.242 0.100 0.144 0.234 0.034 
beta 0.038 0.052 0.028 0.044 - 0.018 0.032 - 
halflife 18.3 13.3 24.4 15.8 - 37.7 21.5 - 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table: A.A.3 : Panel estimation results: convergence in productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Annual growth rate of GDP per persons employed, 
EU15==100 (VLW15_GDP) 
 
1995-2016 1995-2008 2008-2016 
        
alfa -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025) 
    Observations 641 401 240 
R-squared 0.283 0.323 0.127 
beta 0.031 0.032 0.026 
halflife 22.6 21.8 26.4 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Appendix B: Panel unit root and cointegration tests 
Panel unit roots test 
We run panel unit root tests allowing individual unit root processes for different countries, and using 
individual intercepts and trend as exogenous regressors, as some countries exhibit fast, trend-like 
increase in the real exchange rate or development variables. The lag selection is based on SIC, with a 
maximum of 2 lags. The null hypothesis at all the three unit root tests is that the series follows a unit 
root process. The results are summarized in Table 1.  
log_pl15_gdp Statistic Prob Cross-sections Observations 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -0.7735 0.2196 27 555 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 64.3352 0.1585 27 555 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 69.9331 0.0712 27 565 
log_r_p_sg 
    Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  0.38205 0.6488 27 497 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 52.0389 0.5504 27 497 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 37.1841 0.9607 27 509 
log_vlc15_gdp 
    Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -0.09507 0.4621 27 545 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 50.0686 0.6268 27 545 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 26.4532 0.9994 27 565 
log_vlw_gdp 
    Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  2.2695 0.9884 27 557 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 49.7735 0.638 27 557 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 42.7135 0.8659 27 565 
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Cointegration tests  
Null hypothesis: no cointegration 
The Pedroni tests yield mixed results, however, the residual based Kao tests show cointegration for 
all the 4 cases. 
log_pl15_gdp-log_vlc15_gdp Statistic Prob 
Weighted 
stat Weighted prob Observations 
Kao –residual test -2.25979 0.0119 - - 592 
Panel v-Statistic 2.775692 0.0028 0.790076 0.2147 592 
Panel rho-Statistic 2.072456 0.9809 1.893261 0.9708 592 
Panel PP-Statistic 0.393196 0.6529 0.31712 0.6244 592 
Panel ADF-Statistic -0.73496 0.2312 -0.89208 0.1862 592 
log_r_p_sg- log_vlc15_gdp 
  
  
 Kao –residual test -3.72604 0.0001   592 
Panel v-Statistic -0.7884 0.7848 -2.66374 0.9961 592 
Panel rho-Statistic 1.044852 0.852 -0.87865 0.1898 592 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.53414 0.2966 -3.51796 0.0002 592 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.03836 0.0012 -5.50256 0 592 
log_pl15_gdp-log_vlw15_gdp 
  
  
 Kao –residual test -2.68464 0.0036 - - 592 
Panel v-Statistic 8.338302 0.0000 1.234387 0.1085 592 
Panel rho-Statistic 1.527535 0.9367 0.761728 0.7769 592 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.09129 0.4636 -1.84198 0.0327 592 
Panel ADF-Statistic 0.600804 0.726 -1.56642 0.0586 592 
log_r_p_sg- log_vlw15_gdp 
  
  
 Kao –residual test -3.63962 0.000137 - - 592 
Panel v-Statistic 13.7352 0.0000 1.00763 0.1568 592 
Panel rho-Statistic 2.018516 0.9782 0.787318 0.7845 592 
Panel PP-Statistic 1.740798 0.9591 -1.6064 0.0541 592 
Panel ADF-Statistic 0.025589 0.5102 -3.20198 0.0007 592 
*Allowing individual intercept and trend 
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Short term dynamics: ECM equations 
1) with misalignments without control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES dlog_pl15_gdp dlog_pl15_gdp dlog_rp_s_g dlog_rp_s_g 
          
L.misal -0.0747*** -0.0531*** -0.0372*** -0.0309*** 
 
(0.0174) (0.0140) (0.00933) (0.00936) 
dlog_vlc15_gdp 0.269*** 
 
0.164*** 
 
 
(0.0758) 
 
(0.0541) 
 dlog_vlw15_gdp 
 
0.270*** 
 
0.159*** 
  
(0.100) 
 
(0.0552) 
Constant 0.00672*** 0.00695*** 0.00121 0.00172 
 
(0.00199) (0.00213) (0.00122) (0.00125) 
     Observations 565 565 509 509 
R-squared 0.076 0.052 0.075 0.049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
1) with misalignments with control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES dlog_pl15_gdp dlog_pl15_gdp dlog_rp_s_g dlog_rp_s_g 
          
L.misal -0.0911*** -0.0703*** -0.0412*** -0.0366*** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0163) (0.0104) (0.0106) 
dlog_vlc15_gdp 0.319*** 
 
0.219*** 
 
 
(0.0864) 
 
(0.0535) 
 D.open -0.198*** -0.205*** -0.0322 -0.0410 
 
(0.0699) (0.0697) (0.0405) (0.0425) 
D.gov_gdp 0.0254 0.0685 0.607** 0.598*** 
 
(0.355) (0.349) (0.236) (0.229) 
dlog_vlw15_gdp 
 
0.312*** 
 
0.219*** 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.0545) 
Constant 0.00749*** 0.00784*** 0.000754 0.00135 
 
(0.00196) (0.00204) (0.00122) (0.00129) 
     Observations 565 565 509 509 
R-squared 0.109 0.086 0.109 0.080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C : Estimation results – growth equations with control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Ref for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. var qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
         Level         
misal -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.008 -0.015 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Obs 589 530 530 530 530 497 497 497 
R-squared 0.025 0.636 0.607 0.636 0.607 0.635 0.611 0.635 
    Lagged      
L.misal 0.014 0.013 -0.000 -0.000 -0.013 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 523 523 523 523 481 481 481 481 
R-squared 0.639 0.609 0.637 0.607 0.668 0.639 0.668 0.639 
    CEEU      
misal -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 -0.010 0.005 0.027 0.005 0.027 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
misal*ceeu 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.012 -0.032 -0.053** -0.032 -0.053** 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Obs 530 530 530 530 497 497 497 497 
R-squared 0.638 0.608 0.637 0.607 0.637 0.616 0.637 0.616 
    After crisis     
misal 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.005 -0.026* -0.019 -0.026* -0.019 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
misald2009 -0.051** -0.057** -0.030 -0.026 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Obs 530 530 530 530 497 497 497 497 
R-squared 0.640 0.613 0.638 0.609 0.636 0.612 0.636 0.612 
    Fix ER     
misal 0.029** 0.031** 0.027*** 0.027** 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
misalfix -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.065*** -0.050*** -0.065*** -0.050*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Obs 530 530 530 530 497 497 497 497 
R-squared 0.649 0.622 0.650 0.623 0.644 0.617 0.644 0.617 
    Nonlinearity     
u_misal -0.054* -0.049* -0.070 -0.076* -0.072* -0.060 -0.072* -0.060 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
o_misal -0.023 -0.035 0.018 0.027 0.012 0.031 0.012 0.031 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) 
misal_sq_u 0.246*** 0.252*** 0.336** 0.357*** 0.134 0.083 0.134 0.083 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) 
misal_sq_o -0.011 0.021 -0.168 -0.207 0.178 0.189 0.178 0.189 
 (0.242) (0.265) (0.192) (0.196) (0.243) (0.236) (0.243) (0.236) 
Ob -0.054* -0.049* -0.070 -0.076* -0.072* -0.060 -0.072* -0.060 
R-squared (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls and time fixed effect included 
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Appendix D : Estimation results – growth equations  estimated by GMM  
D.1 Fixed effect DOLS estimations for the long term relationship  
External price level 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DOLS  DOLS 
 DOLS controls DOLS controls 
VARIABLES log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp log_pl15_gdp 
     
log_vlc15_gdp 0.562*** 0.524***   
 (0.062) (0.083)   
nxdebt2_gdp  0.015  0.00762 
  (0.010)  (0.00903) 
lntot_eff  -1.520  -2.840* 
  (1.923)  (1.642) 
open  0.323  0.322 
  (0.190)  (0.196) 
gov_gdp  0.003  -0.000763 
  (0.009)  (0.00671) 
log_vlw15_gdp   0.605*** 0.547*** 
   (0.075) (0.0643) 
Constant 1.818*** 1.792*** 1.632*** 1.765*** 
 (0.254) (0.494) (0.307) (0.337) 
     
Observations 591 532 591 532 
R-squared 0.691 0.703 0.705 0.728 
Number of con 27 27 27 27 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Internal relative price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DOLS  DOLS 
 DOLS controls DOLS controls 
VARIABLES log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g log_rp_s_g 
     
log_vlc15_gdp 0.230*** 0.256***   
 (0.057) (0.055)   
nxdebt2_gdp  0.013*  0.010 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
lntot_eff  -2.371*  -3.037** 
  (1.227)  (1.135) 
open  0.208  0.216 
  (0.129)  (0.139) 
gov_gdp  0.012**  0.011* 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
log_vlw15_gdp   0.255*** 0.271*** 
   (0.080) (0.061) 
Constant 3.368*** 2.932*** 3.247*** 2.879*** 
 (0.244) (0.298) (0.346) (0.318) 
     
Observations 535 496 535 496 
R-squared 0.440 0.522 0.399 0.506 
Number of con 27 27 27 27 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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D2: The table contains growth regressions where both the misalignments and the growth regressions 
are estimated with country fixed effects. The method in the growth regression is Arellano-Bond type 
GMM and the misalignment – and it’s interaction term with dummy variables is treated as 
endogenous variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Ref for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
Var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
         Level         
misal -0.005 -0.006 -0.015* -0.017 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    CEEU     
misal -0.012 -0.021 -0.016 -0.023 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.007 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) 
misal*ceeu 0.011 0.025 0.001 0.011 -0.048* -0.035 -0.045* -0.033 
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    After crisis     
misal -0.004 -0.008 -0.016* -0.020* -0.039* -0.041* -0.039* -0.041* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) 
misald2009 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Obs 
538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    Fix ER     
misal 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
misalfix -0.047** -0.050** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Obs 
538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    Nonlinearity     
u_misal -0.064 -0.067 -0.056 -0.050 -0.037 -0.013 -0.024 -0.001 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.049) (0.048) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.041) 
o_misal -0.056 -0.065 -0.056 -0.061 -0.041 -0.073 -0.038 -0.071 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.065) (0.066) (0.046) (0.050) (0.054) (0.056) 
misal_sq_u 0.219* 0.236** 0.146 0.133 0.003 -0.033 -0.024 -0.063 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.127) (0.132) (0.070) (0.077) (0.066) (0.075) 
misal_sq_o 0.162 0.172 0.121 0.120 0.239* 0.320** 0.201 0.279* 
 (0.171) (0.186) (0.153) (0.152) (0.131) (0.141) (0.139) (0.144) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls included. 
The estimation is carried out with robust standard errors, using xtabond2 stata command 
 
 
 
 
D3: The table contains growth regressions where both the misalignments and the growth regressions 
are estimated with country fixed effects. The method in the growth regression is Arellano-Bond type 
GMM and the misalignment – and it’s interaction term with dummy variables is treated as 
endogenous variable. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Ref for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
Var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
         Level         
misal -0.013 -0.014 -0.040 -0.038 -0.009 -0.023 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
Obs 511 511 511 511 481 481 481 481 
    CEEU     
misal -0.010 -0.033 -0.047 -0.051 0.090* 0.073 0.081 0.076 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) 
misal*ceeu -0.014 0.017 -0.003 0.014 -0.186** -0.174** -0.149* -0.149* 
 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.071) (0.071) (0.085) (0.085) (0.079) (0.081) 
Obs 511 511 511 511 481 481 481 481 
    After crisis     
misal -0.013 -0.014 -0.040 -0.039 -0.045 -0.060 -0.039 -0.048 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
misald2009 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Obs 511 511 511 511 481 481 481 481 
    Fix ER     
misal 0.005 0.000 -0.026 -0.024 -0.009 -0.024 -0.001 -0.012 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
misalfix -0.144*** -0.151*** -0.131*** -0.127*** 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.013 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Obs 511 511 511 511 481 481 481 481 
    Nonlinearity     
u_misal -0.139 -0.143* -0.225** -0.208* -0.303 -0.277 -0.246 -0.231 
 (0.085) (0.080) (0.110) (0.108) (0.217) (0.225) (0.219) (0.222) 
o_misal -0.124 -0.151 -0.204 -0.203* 0.021 -0.010 0.025 0.006 
 (0.117) (0.114) (0.127) (0.119) (0.091) (0.087) (0.094) (0.093) 
misal_sq_u 0.334** 0.367** 0.516** 0.510** 0.391 0.341 0.340 0.310 
 (0.164) (0.158) (0.247) (0.250) (0.302) (0.316) (0.305) (0.308) 
misal_sq_o 0.339 0.354 0.419 0.387 0.203 0.250 0.117 0.153 
 (0.277) (0.278) (0.277) (0.266) (0.261) (0.242) (0.225) (0.214) 
Obs 511 511 511 511 481 481 481 481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls included. 
The estimation is carried out with robust standard errors, using xtabond2 stata command 
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D4: The table contains growth regressions where the misalignments are estimated with only year 
dummies, but the growth regressions are estimated with country fixed effect. The method is system-
GMM, misalignment – and it’s interaction term with dummy variables is treated as endogenous 
variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Ref for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
var(dlog)       qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
         Level         
misal -0.012 -0.014 -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.022* -0.022 -0.022* -0.022 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    CEEU     
misal -0.028 -0.037* -0.030** -0.036** -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) 
misal*ceeu 0.024 0.036 0.008 0.016 -0.017 -0.010 -0.017 -0.010 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    After crisis     
misal 0.005 0.002 -0.014* -0.018** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
misald2009 -0.044* -0.042 -0.032 -0.027 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    Fix ER     
misal 0.024** 0.027** 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
misalfix -0.091*** -0.102*** -0.079*** -0.086*** -0.058* -0.056* -0.058* -0.056* 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Obs 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
    Nonlinearity     
u_misal -0.093** -0.096** -0.164*** -0.172** -0.039 -0.041 -0.039 -0.041 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.064) (0.067) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
o_misal 0.047 0.029 0.055 0.041 -0.066 -0.070 -0.066 -0.070 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
misal_sq_u 0.263** 0.290** 0.461** 0.495** 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008 
 (0.105) (0.114) (0.207) (0.221) (0.105) (0.114) (0.105) (0.114) 
misal_sq_o -0.254 -0.194 -0.191 -0.146 0.355** 0.405** 0.355** 0.405** 
 (0.254) (0.259) (0.171) (0.178) (0.152) (0.159) (0.152) (0.159) 
Ob 538 538 538 538 508 508 508 508 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls included. 
The estimation is carried out with robust standard errors, using xtabond2 stata command 
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D5: The table contains growth regressions where the misalignments are estimated with only year 
dummies, but the growth regressions are estimated with country fixed effect. The method is 
Arellano-Bond type difference GMM, and the misalignment – and it’s interaction term with dummy 
variables is treated as endogenous variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Ref for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
Var(dlog) qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
         Level         
misal -0.012 -0.011 -0.047 -0.042 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Obs 509 509 509 509 481 481 481 481 
    CEEU     
misal -0.023 -0.043 -0.069 -0.071 0.027 0.023 0.027 0.023 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) 
misal*ceeu 0.001 0.028 0.020 0.036 -0.077 -0.062 -0.077 -0.062 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.068) 
Obs 509 509 509 509 481 481 481 481 
    After crisis     
misal -0.004 -0.002 -0.043 -0.038 -0.020 -0.016 -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
misald2009 -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 -0.032 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Obs 509 509 509 509 481 481 481 481 
    Fix ER     
misal 0.017 0.019 -0.024 -0.019 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) 
misalfix -0.118*** -0.136*** -0.116** -0.119** -0.034 -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Obs 509 509 509 509 481 481 481 481 
    Nonlinearity     
u_misal -0.114* -0.112* -0.327*** -0.325*** -0.030 -0.018 -0.030 -0.018 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.106) (0.102) (0.058) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) 
o_misal 0.060 0.026 0.025 0.019 -0.063 -0.086 -0.063 -0.086 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.097) (0.093) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) 
misal_sq_u 0.291** 0.323*** 0.930*** 0.984*** -0.039 -0.037 -0.039 -0.037 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.296) (0.287) (0.177) (0.174) (0.177) (0.174) 
misal_sq_o -0.455 -0.361 -0.233 -0.210 0.243 0.337 0.243 0.337 
 (0.380) (0.369) (0.226) (0.214) (0.208) (0.214) (0.208) (0.214) 
Ob 509 509 509 509 481 481 481 481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls included. 
The estimation is carried out with robust standard errors, using xtabond2 stata command 
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Appendix E: Asymmetry in the effect of RER misalignment with respect to level of development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in 
misal External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference 
for misal VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. 
variable qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp qc_gdp q_gdp 
 
        
misal -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
misal*undev 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.021 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Obs 563 563 563 563 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.629 0.604 0.633 0.608 0.635 0.613 0.635 0.613 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
undev: dummy for observations where vlc15_gdp<=0.7 
 
Appendix F 
Table 6.14: GMM estimations on the effect of RER misalignment  on investment/GDP and export 
market share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RER in mis External price level(PL_15_GDP) Internal relative price(RP_SG) 
Reference in mis VLC VLW VLC VLW 
Dep. var dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp dlog_ms inv_gdp 
Difference 
GMM                  
misal 0.011 -0.051** -0.017 -0.015 -0.088** -0.040* -0.088** -0.040* 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.034) (0.018) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) 
Observations 507 532 507 532 479 493 479 493 
System GMM         
misal -0.040** -0.010 -0.044*** -0.002 -0.059*** -0.011 -0.059*** -0.011 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) 
Observations 534 559 534 559 506 520 506 520 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Estimated with xtabond2 Stata command, specifying misalignment as endogenous variable. The misalignments come from the fixed effect 
specification of the long term relationship. 
Appendix G 
Appendix G.1 and G.2 show the estimated misalignments for countries without and with controls, 
respectively, for the external price level and the internal relative price. Though the estimated long 
term relationship is similar in case of the external price level and the internal relative price, the 
misalignment implied by these two concepts of real exchange rate might differ considerably. 
However, for the CEE countries, the two indicators of misalignments are typically close to each other, 
as in these countries the external price level and the internal relative price move closely together.  
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Figure G.1: Estimated misalignments for CEEU and non-CEEU countries without controls 
 
 
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
BG
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
CZ
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
EE
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
HR
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
HU
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
LT
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
LV
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
PL
-.
2
0
.2
.4
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
RO
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
SI
-.
4
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
SK
mis_pl_vlc_te_dols mis_pl_vlw_te_dols
mis_rp_vlc_te_dols mis_rp_vlw_te_dols
-.
1-.
0
5 0
.0
5 .
1
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
AT
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
BE
-.
2-
.1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
CY
-.
1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
DE
-.
1 0
.1
.2
.3
.4
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
DK
-.
2-
.1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
EL
-.
2-
.1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
ES
0
.1
.2
.3
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
FI
-.
1-.
0
5 0.
0
5 .
1.1
5
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
FR
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
IE
-.
3-
.2-
.1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
IT
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
MT
-.
2-
.1
0
.1
.2
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
NL
-.
0
5 0
.0
5 .
1.
1
5
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
PT
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
SE
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
m
is
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t,
 %
1990 2000 2010 2020
year
UK
mis_pl_vlc_te_dols mis_pl_vlw_te_dols
mis_rp_vlc_te_dols mis_rp_vlw_te_dols
93 
 
Figure G.2: Estimated misalignments for CEEU and non CEEU countries with controls  
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Appendix H: Wages and productivity 
Table H1: Fixed effect estimation of the relationship between relative wages (in PPS) and relative 
productivity (in PPS) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES log_𝑟𝑝𝑤15𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒  log_𝑟𝑝𝑤15𝑃𝑃𝑃
ℎ  
   
log_vlw15_gdp 0.864***  
 (0.081)  
log_vlh15_gdp  0.859*** 
  (0.091) 
Constant 0.512 0.489 
 (0.341) (0.378) 
   
Observations 586 564 
R-squared 0.894 0.874 
Number of con 27 27 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table H2: GMM growth regressions with wage misalignments 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
mis_compl_e mis_compl_e mis_compl_h mis_compl_h 
VARIABLES dlog_qc_gdp dlog_q_gdp dlog_qc_gdp dlog_q_gdp 
Difference  GMM  
    misal -0.095 -0.077 -0.087 -0.068 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) 
Observations 506 506 498 498 
System GMM     
 -0.030* -0.029 -0.028* -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 533 533 525 525 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notations: mis_compl_e :  misalignment in wages , based on number of employees 
Notations: mis_compl_h:  misalignment in wages , based on number of worked hours 
Estimated with xtabond2 Stata command, specifying misalignment as endogenous variable. The misalignments come from the fixed 
effect specification of long term relationship. 
 
 
 
Appendix I. Statistical sources 
Regarding PPPs (relative external and internal prices) our principal source is the Eurostat PPP-
database, but for checking consistency, we also relied on the PPP-database of the OECD. As for per 
capita GDP and productivity, we used the AMECO-database, regarding both levels at current PPPs 
and chained linked volumes at 2010 constant prices. The data expressed at constant PPP of the year 
2010 relative to the EU15 are based on our own calculations (i.e., the combination of relative levels 
at current PPSs in 2010 with relative volume indices or price deflators.).  
We used several variables as controls in our empirical estimations. These variables are listed below; 
their source is given in parentheses. 
- Trade openness: [(X+M)/2]/GDP (AMECO) 
95 
 
- Public deficit/GDP (AMECO) 
- Public consumption/GDP (AMECO) 
-  Inflation (AMECO)  
- The effect of the terms of trade on real gross domestic income (AMECO) 
- Fixed gross capital formation/GDP (Eurostat) 
- Economic freedom index (The Heritage Foundation) 
- Net external debt (IMF). The net external debt contains assets minus liabilities of other investments, 
portfolio investments, financial derivatives, and reserve assets. The foreign direct investments are 
not included.  
-life expectancy at birth (Eurostat) 
- Share of 15-64 years population with tertiary education (Eurostat) 
